THE NLRB'S FIRST RULEMAKING:
AN EXERCISE IN PRAGMATISM
MARK

H. GRUNEWALD*

INTRODUCTION

Despite having been granted both rulemaking and adjudicatory
power in its statutory charter more than half a century ago,1 the National
Labor Relations Board has chosen to formulate policy almost exclusively

through the process of adjudication. 2 Decades of critical commentary, 3

* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. This Article is adapted
from a study prepared by the author as a consultant to the Administrative Conference of the United
States (ACUS). On June 14, 1991, ACUS adopted a set of recommendations based upon the study.
See Facilitating the Use of Rulemaking by the National Labor Relations Board, 56 Fed. Reg.
33,851-52 (1991) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.91-5). The views expressed in this Article, however, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of members of ACUS or its committees except where formal recommendations of ACUS are cited.
1. See National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988)) "The Board shall have authority from time to
time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." Id. at § 156.
2. The Board did use rulemaking to establish jurisdictional standards for private colleges and
universities, see 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (1991), and for symphony orchestras, see id. § 103.2. It also used
rulemaking in deciding not to assert jurisdiction over the horse racing industry. See id. § 103.3; see
also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS AcT 1631 nn. 214-16 (Charles J.Morris ed., 2d ed. 1983).
3. See, eg., Merton C. Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-RuleMaking Dilemma Under the
Administrative ProcedureAct, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970) (suggesting that the Board make greater use
of its rulemaking powers); Samuel Estreicher, Policy Oscillation at the Labor Board: A Pleafor
Rulemaking, 37 ADMiN. L. REV. 163, 181 (1985) (arguing that the use of rulemaking for policy
reversals would "improve the quality of the [Board]'s decisions, its success rate in the courts, and,
ultimately, its institutional standing"); Kenneth Kahn, The NLRB andHigherEducation: The Failure ofPolicymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L. REv. 63, 167-75 (1973) (claiming that the
Board's use of adjudication in the field of unit determinations for college and university faculty has
produced bad case law and may lead to results not intended by the Board); Charles J.Morris, The
NLRB in the Dog House-Can an Old BoardLearn New Tricks?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 9 (1987)
(criticizing the Board's record on enforcement of core employee protection provisions); Cornelius J.

Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers ofthe NationalLaborRelationsBoard, 70 YALE L.J. 729,
756 (1961) [hereinafter Peck, Rule-Making Powers] (condemning the Board's reliance on ad hoc

policymaking as being harmful to both the Board's own program and general public and private
interests); Cornelius J.Peck, A Critique of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in
Policy Formulation: Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968) (describing the
detrimental aspects of the Board's adherence to adjudication); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of

Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921,
922 (1965) (evaluating the advantages of both rulemaking and adjudication and presenting some
benefits to greater reliance on rulemaking); Carl S. Silverman, The Case for the National Labor
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frequent prodding from reviewing courts, 4 and legislative proposals for
mandatory rulemaking5 had no apparent effect on the Board's commitment to adjudication as its single method of policy formulation. Even as
rulemaking eclipsed adjudication as the preferred method for policymaking among other major federal agencies, 6 the Board steadfastly clung to
the quasi-judicial approach, almost as a necessary tenet in the regulation
of labor-management relations. It seemed the Board was one federal
agency that would never be persuaded of the virtues of notice and comment rulemaking.
Then, on July 2, 1987, these startling words appeared in the Federal
Register:
In order to facilitate the election process, the National Labor Relations
Board proposes to amend its rules to include a new provision specifying which bargaining units will be found appropriate in various types
of health care facilities. The Board has resolved to utilize notice-andcomment rulemaking rather than be presented with continuing lengthy
and costly litigation over the issue of appropriate bargaining units in
may submit oral testimony in connection
each case. Interested parties
7
with the proposed rules.

Relations Board's Use of Rulemaking in Asserting Jurisdiction, 25 LAB. L.J. 607 (1974) (suggesting
that the Board could better effectuate the purposes and policies of the NLRA by rulemaking rather
than by adjudication); Berton B. Subrin, ConservingEnergy at the Labor Board: The Casefor Making Rules on Collective Bargaining Units, 32 LAB. LJ. 105 (1981) (concluding that the Board's
policy of determining the appropriate bargaining unit by case-by-case adjudication is inefficient and
creates harmful uncertainties that could be eliminated by rulemaking). But see Robert L. Willmore,
Note, NLRB Rulemaking: PoliticalReality Versus ProceduralFairness, 89 YALE L.J. 982 (1980)
(arguing that Board's reliance on adjudication minimizes congressional and judicial intervention and
thus gives the Board needed flexibility in developing policy).
4. See eg., NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1466 (7th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the
Board's strict adherence to adjudication in applying section 2(11) of the NLRA has made it vulnerable to charges of opportunism, and concluding that the Board would be entitled to more judicial
deference in its interpretation "if it had awakened its dormant rulemaking powers for the purpose of
particularizing the application of section 2(11) to the medical field"); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving
Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting the "increasing expression of regret" over the Board's
failure to increase its use of rulemaking); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764
(1969) (stating that where the Board purports to make a general rule it cannot use adjudication to
avoid compliance with the provisions of the APA that govern rulemaking).
5. Provisions of the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1978, S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
124 CONG. Rac. 1505, would have required the Board to make greater use of rulemaking in some
areas, most notably in delineating "plainly appropriate units" for purposes of collective bargaining.
See S. REP. No. 628, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1978).
6. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 167 (3d ed. 1991).
7. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) [hereinafter NPR I] (notice of proposed rulemaking and notice of hearing).
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Almost two years later the Board published a final rule governing

bargaining unit determinations in health care facilities. 8 The Board's institutional resolve against substantive rulemaking appeared to have collapsed, and it was possible to imagine wide-ranging and vigorous use of

this previously dormant policymaking device in the labor relations area.
This Article documents the Board's first major use of rulemaking,

evaluates its significance, and identifies aspects of the experience that suggest a need for possible reform. 9 The challenge of the exercise lies in
balancing an understanding of the uniqueness of the policy problem that
triggered the rulemaking with an appreciation of the richness of this experience as a guide to possible broader use of rulemaking by the Board.
Part I reviews briefly the law and policy governing agency choice between rulemaking and adjudication in the regulatory process and the implications of that choice for the Board. Part II chronicles the
developments in unit determinations under the Health Care Amend-

ments of 1974 that led to the Board's decision to use rulemaking. Part
III discusses the dynamics of the rulemaking process and the evolution of
the rule itself. Part IV examines the litigation sparked by the promulgation of the final rule, and the impact of that litigation on the Board's
activities. Finally, Part V considers the broader implications of this
novel undertaking by the Board, attempts to evaluate its relative success

in accomplishing its goals, and makes recommendations that might improve future rulemaking proceedings. The Article concludes that, despite the promise that rulemaking holds for the regulation of labor
8. Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1991). The
rule, along with background and rationale, was originally published as Collective-Bargaining Units
in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (1989) [hereinafter Final Rule]. Subsequent references to the Final Rule will therefore be made to the FederalRegister.
9. As part of the study, the author conducted in-person and telephone interviews with agency
officials and members of the labor-management bar. [hereinafter Interviews]. The author's description of certain aspects of the rulemaking is drawn from these interviews'collectively, but no part of
the description is intended to reflect the views of any individual interviewee.
The following persons were interviewed:
James M. Stephens, Chairman, National Labor Relations Board; Mary Miller Cracraft, Member, National Labor Relations Board; Dennis M. Devaney, Member, National Labor Relations
Board; Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., Member, National Labor Relations Board; John E. Higgins, Solicitor,
National Labor Relations Board; John C. Trnesdale, Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board; Linda Sher, Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board; Berton Subrin,
Director, Office of Representation Appeals; Sandra Elligers, Attorney, Office of Representation Appeals; Bernard Ries, Administrative Law Judge, National Labor Relations Board; Thomas P. Burke,
Co-Chair, Committee on National Labor Relations Board Practice and Procedure, American Bar
Association Section on Labor Law; Lawrence B. Miller, Co-Chair, Committee on National Labor
Relations Board Practice and Procedure, American Bar Association Section on Labor Law; and
David A. Grant, Chair, Labor and Employment Law Committee, American Bar Association Section
on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.
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relations, the prospect for further use of rulemaking by the Board depends largely on its evaluation of the costs and benefits of this undertaking as the rule is implemented.
I.
A.

THE CHOICE BETWEEN RULEMAKING AND ADJUDICATION

Agency Discretion to Choose

The Board's historic resistance to rulemaking as an instrument of
policymaking forms an important part of the more general issue of the
degree to which administrative agencies have the discretion to choose
between rulemaking and adjudication and the legal and policy consequences of that choice.10 As early as 1947, the need for agency discretion
in the choice between the two modes of procedure was acknowledged by
the Supreme Court in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II):11
Since the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, unlike a court, does
have the ability to make new law prospectively through the exercise of
its rule-making powers, it has less reason to rely upon ad hoe adjudication to formulate new standards of conduct within the framework of
the Holding Company Act. The function of filling in the interstices of
the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through this quasilegislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future. But any
rigid requirement to that effect would make the administrative process
inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the specialized
problems which arise. Not every principle essential to the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast immediately into the
mold of a general rule. Some principles must await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet particular, unforeseeable
situations. In performing its important functions in these respects,
therefore, an administrative agency must be equipped to act either by
action
general rule or by individual order. To insist upon one form1 of
2
to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.

By the time of Chenery II, the Board had, in its first twelve years of
operation, established a firm commitment to adjudication. During this
period, the substance of the Board's policymaking, the agency structure
for decisionmaking, and the scope of judicial review of its decisions were
the primary subjects of controversy.1 3 The Board's exclusive reliance on
adjudication was of little interest. The Taft-Hartley Act of 194714 reaffirmed the Board's rulemaking authority and made such action subject to
10. See Richard K. Berg, Re-examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking
and Adjudication, 38 ADMIN. L. RxV. 149 (1986); Arthur E. Bonfield, State Administrative Policy
Formulation and the Choice of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. RV. 121 (1990).
11. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
12. Id. at 202 (citation omitted).
13. The 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA addressed each of these matters, in addition to establishing curbs on union power. See H.R. REP. No. 240, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-6 (1947).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988).
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the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' 5 but apparently this amendment was neither intended nor understood to encourage the Board to
16
make greater use of that authority.
Over the next two decades, the use of rulemaking in major federal
agencies grew, and a body of commentary and judicial opinion developed
encouraging and approving this move.1 7 In turn, the policy considerations underlying the decision in Chenery II came into sharper focus, and
ultimately the issue shifted to the question of limits on agency discretion
to choose between modes of procedure. The power of agencies to resolve
recurring issues in adjudicatory hearings by establishing general principles under their rulemaking authority was broadly asserted and approved. 8 The gains in administrative efficiency achieved through the use
of general rules were frequently seen by the courts, as outweighing the
previously assumed superiority of policy incrementally evolved through
case-by-case consideration. 1 9 At the same time, rulemaking was acknowledged to offer a broader opportunity for public participation and
more meaningful notice to affected parties of regulatory standards. 20
These efficiency and fairness arguments supporting agency choice of
rulemaking generally carried the day. 21 The controversy centered instead on the choice of adjudication. Here, the Board's long-standing reliance on adjudication tested the limits of the discretion conferred by
Chenery II.
15. Id. § 156.
16. The purpose of the amendment appears to have been to make clear that the Board's exercise
of its rnlemaking authority would have to conform to the procedural requirements of the thenrecently enacted APA. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1947).
17. See RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 34-36 (1985);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 170-71.
18. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202-06 (1956) (upholding authority of FCC to promulgate and to enforce rule denying additional licenses to parties already
holding five or more television stations despite language in Communications Act of 1934 that required a "full hearing" before denials of such licenses); see also WBEN, Inc. v. United States, 396
F.2d 601, 617-22 (2d Cir.) (rejecting argument that provisions of Communications Act of 1934 that
require evidentiary hearings before license modification prevent FCC from promulgating rule establishing a new system for pre-sunrise operations by certain classes of AM radio stations), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 914 (1968); American Airlines, Inc., v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 628-33 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (upholding Civil Aeronautics Board use of rulemaking to allow only all-cargo carriers to
provide "block space service" based on agency need for the flexibility rulemaking provides, and
concluding that the fairness of the proceeding would not have been enhanced by requiring adjudicatory procedures).
19. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 170-71.
20. See PIERCE, supra note 17, at 322-27.
21. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding FTC authority to engage in substantive trade regulation rulemaking on grounds of efficiency
and fairness despite lack of express authorization for rulemaking in Trade Commission Act).
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The Board's refusal to use its rulemaking authority for substantive
matters drew criticism in 1958 from the American Bar Association's Labor Law Section. The Section recommended that the Board reconsider
its position that the promulgation of certain of its most rule-like policies
did not require compliance with the rulemaking procedures of the
APA.

22

A few years later, in a seminal work on the subject, Professor

Cornelius Peck broadly challenged the Board's position that its work inherently demanded an adjudicatory approach, and urged that the Board
undertake rulemaking for a portion of its work.23 Over the next several
years, a series of actions at the Board culminated in a Supreme Court
decision specifically addressing the question of whether a policy an-

nounced in the course of an adjudication was in fact a "rule" that required compliance with the APA for its promulgation.
In NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. ,24 a divided Court upheld the ap-

plication of a rule-like policy announced (although not applied) in one
adjudication to a different party in a subsequent adjudication. A majority of the Court, however, through several separate opinions, 2 5 expressed
disapproval of the Board's disregard of the APA procedures for rulemaking, particularly in light of the Board's decision in the original adjudication to apply the policy only prospectively. Wyman-Gordon was
generally interpreted as signaling the Court's intention to scrutinize more
closely the Board's avoidance of the rulemaking process. 26 The unusual
division of opinions in the case, 27 however, left unclear how more
22. See Report of the Committee on National Labor Relations Practice and Procedure, 1958
A.B.A. SE c. LAB. REL. L. 110. The recommendation, approved by the House of Delegates, provided that "[t]he Board should reconsider its views that its decisional policies on such matters as
jurisdictional standards and contract-bar rules do not come within the rule-making requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act." Id. at 121.
23. Peck, Rule-Making Powers, supra note 3.
24. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
25. See id. at 764-66 (plurality opinion) (Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Stewart, J., and
White, J.); id. at 775-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 780-81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
26. See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 573-74.
27. Justice Fortas, in an opinion joined by three other Justices, concluded that the Board had
promulgated a "rule" in Excelsior Underwearwithout complying with the rulemaking procedures of
the APA, but the application of the rule to Wyman-Gordon was lawful because it occurred in an
separate adjudication directed specifically to Wyman-Gordon. Justice Black, in an opinion joined by
two others, concluded the so-called "rule" was the valid product of an the adjudication of the Excelsior Underwear case and within the scope of agency discretion to formulate policy through either
adjudication or rulemaking. In a separate dissent, Justice Douglas concluded that the Excelsior
"rule" was clearly intended by the Board to have general applicability in future cases and that to
formulate it in an adjudication would violate the letter and purpose of the APA. Justice Harlan
concluded that the Board's decision not to apply the Excelsior "rule" to the Excelsior company itself
made the policy one of only "future effect" thereby falling within the APA's definition of a rule.
Thus, of the nine Justices participating, only Douglas and Harlan would have denied the Board the
power to apply the "rule" in future cases even though they and four other Justices (Fortas and the
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intensive scrutiny might be accomplished consistent with the discretion
accorded by Chenery 11.28
Less than five years after Wyman-Gordon, the Court granted certiorari in a case in which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had
sought to apply the admonitions of Wyman-Gordon in reviewing a new
Board policy formulated in an adjudication. 29 Rebuffing the panel's effort, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 30 unanimously
reaffirmed the application of Chenery 11 and sustained the Board's application of the "managerial employee" exemption to certain industrial buyers. 3 1 The Court observed:
The views expressed in Chenery II and Wyman-Gordon make plain
that the Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an
adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion.
Although there may be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the
Act, nothing in the present case would justify such a conclusion. Indeed, there is ample indication that adjudication is especially appropriate in the instant context.... [D]uties of buyers vary widely depending
on the company or industry. It is doubtful whether any generalized
standard could be framed which would have more than marginal utility. The Board thus has reason to proceed with caution, developing its
standards in a case-by-case manner with attention to the specific character of the buyers' authority and duties in each company. The
Board's judgment
that adjudication best serves this purpose is entitled
32
to great weight.
three Justices concurring with him) found the rule to have been improperly promulgated because of
the Board's failure to comply with APA rulemaking procedures.
28. See Bernstein, supra note 3, at 598.

29. Bell Aerospace Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973). The new policy reformulated
the Board's classification and treatment of "managerial employees." The Court of Appeals concluded that, because a majority of Justices in Wyman-Gordon indicated that changes in rules of
general application can be effected only through compliance with the rulemaking provisions of the
APA, the Board's use of adjudication to modify its classification of "managerial employees" was
invalid. See id. at 495-96.
30. 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
31. See id. at 290-95. However, the Court rejected the Board's attempt to apply a new interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act, one that allowed some "managerial employees" to be covered by the
Act, to the adjudication before it. The case was therefore remanded to the Board so that it could
apply the proper legal standard. See id. at 289-90.
32. Id at 294. The Court continued by distinguishing the Bell Aerospace circumstances from
those cases in which concerns about retroactive effect would be greater:
The possible reliance of industry on the Board's past decision with respect to buyers does
not require a different result. It has not been shown that the adverse consequences ensuing
from such reliance are so substantial that the Board should be precluded from reconsidering the issue in an adjudicative proceeding. Furthermore, this is not a case in which some
new liability is sought to be imposed on individuals for past actions which were taken in
good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements. Nor are fines or damages involved here.
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Thus, Wyman-Gordon and Bell Aerospace only modestly constrain
the discretion of the Board to choose between rulemaking and adjudication. Although either harsh retroactive effects of a new policy formulated and applied in an adjudication, or the unseemliness of a new policy
announced but not applied in a particular adjudication may trigger closer
judicial scrutiny, the Court has remained largely faithful to the Chenery
II view that flexibility in the choice of mode of procedure is an essential
attribute of administration.
B.

PracticalConsiderationsin the Choice of Mode of Procedure

Although Wyman-Gordon and Bell Aerospace address the formal
limits on the Board's exercise of discretion in the choice of procedural
mode, the ongoing controversy has more concerned the practical implications of the Board's preference for adjudication in the accomplishment
of its regulatory mission. Broadly stated, there are five considerations:
(1) the form and nature of the data upon which Board policy is based; (2)
the openness of the policymaking process; (3) the clarity of Board policy;
(4) the stability of Board policy; and (5) the efficiency of the policy enforcement process. 33 Each of these concerns is independently quite complex, and that complexity is compounded by the relationships between
them. For present purposes, a synthesis (rather than an elaboration) of
them is likely to be most helpful.
The policy product of Board adjudications generally takes one of
two forms. First, there are cases in the common law mode that involve
application of established policy to particular facts.3 4 Cases of this kind,
because of subtle changes over time, represent an evolutionary, incremental form of policymaking. Second, there are cases in which the
Board, acting more in a legislative mode, uses the immediate controversy
simply as a vehicle to announce more drastic policy changes without
much regard for the particular facts.35 When proceeding in the legislative mode, the essence of the policy product is indistinguishable from the
product of a rulemaking. The policy formulated may be an extremely
33. See Estriecher, supra note 3, at 171-77; Morris, supra note 3, at 27-42; Peck, Rule-Making
Powers, supra note 3, at 752-61.
34. This class of cases is well illustrated by the fact-intensive unfair labor practice adjudications
in which the Board determines whether particular bargaining meets the "good faith" standard of
section 8(d) of the NLRA. E.g., NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwich, Inc., 723 F.2d 872 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984).
35. This class of cases is well illustrated by Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236
(1966), the adjudication at issue in Wyman-Gordon. Excelsior established the policy that seven days
after an election is directed or consented to the employer must provide to the Board for transmittal
to the union a list of the names and addresses of employees who will be eligible to vote in the
election. Id.
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precise rule that requires only mechanical application, or it may be a
vague, open-ended rule that sets out only the general contours by which
future cases are to be decided. The particularity of the policy in one
instance or the generality of it in another may have important enforcement implications, but both kinds of policy formulated in this fashion
share an important feature. It is formulated exclusively from argument
and evidence that theparties to the proceeding offer (evaluated in light of
the Board's expertise). Consequently, it formally lacks as a basis the
breadth of data that rulemaking submissions can provide, and even the
data upon which it is based is presented by a limited number of participants. The seriousness of these shortcomings is then a critical issue in
evaluating the choice not to use notice and comment rulemaking in cases
taking this form. Cases taking the traditional common law form raise no
such questions and would arise even where true rules requiring more
than mechanical application were in place.
The breadth and sources of the data for policymaking are thus both
obvious and fundamental concerns. Concern with policy clarity and stability is more subtle and perhaps peripheral. Because the line between
the two forms of adjudication described above is not always clear, important policy changes can be lost (or hidden) in the reasoning process of
adjudication. Similarly, the opportunity exists for unanticipated policy
shifts, unanticipated both in the sense of limited notice of the prospect of
change and in the volatility of existing policy majorities in the face of
changes in Board membership. Rulemaking thus provides clarity, not in
the sense of the specificity of policy (which may vary from rule to rule),
but in the identification of a decision as a policy choice. It also provides
stability, not in the sense of unchangeable policy, but in policy that can
not be changed without a process focused on the policy choice.
Finally, the policymaking procedure can affect the efficiency of the
enforcement process. To the extent that a single rulemaking can lay to
rest important policy issues that would otherwise require a long series of
adjudications, enforcement is advanced. Moreover, in rulemaking, the
policymaking agenda can be set internally with a view toward enforcement needs, rather than externally in the form of cases that parties
choose to press. Nevertheless, much of the value of rulemaking remains
dependent upon time expended, resources consumed, and, most importantly, the form of the rulemaking product.
II. THE BOARD'S CHOICE OF RULEMAKING: HEALTH CARE
BARGAINING UNITS

The Board's choice of health care bargaining units for its first major
rulemaking is inextricably intertwined with the agency's struggle with
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that subject for nearly fifteen years after the passage of the Health Care
Amendments to the NLRA in 1974.36 It is therefore necessary to consider preliminarily, but briefly, the background of the substantive issue
that the Board chose to deal with through rulemaking.
A.

The 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act

In the early years of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the
Board asserted jurisdiction over non-profit hospitals.3 7 The Taft-Hartley
amendments of 1947 reversed that policy by excluding such institutions
from the definition of "employer. ' 38 Thereafter the Board equalized the.
status of all hospitals under the NLRA by refusing to assert jurisdiction
over proprietary hospitals as well.3 9 Then, in 1967, the Board reversed
course and asserted jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals, 4° leaving only
non-profit hospitals statutorily excluded. The Health Care Amendments
to the Act in 1974 finally settled the question of coverage for all hospitals
by repealing the statutory exclusion for non-profit hospitals.4 1 Thus, after 1974, health care institutions became subject to Board jurisdiction
without regard to their status as proprietary or non-profit.
In addition to resolving the coverage issue, the 1974 amendments
included substantive provisions that govern labor-management relations
in the health care fields specifically. A provision that was proposed, but
not enacted, would have limited the Board to finding only four appropriate bargaining units in the health industry: (1) a unit of all professionals;
(2) a unit of all technical employees; (3) a unit of all clerical employees;
and (4) a unit of all maintenance and service employees. 42 This proposal
was grounded in the view, propounded by health care employers, that
Board unit determinations based upon a more refined analysis of the
36. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1988)).
37. See Central Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 50 N.L.R.B. 393 (1943), aff'd, 145 F.2d 852
(D.C. Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 847 (1945).
38. The legislation amended the Act's definition of employer to exclude "any corporation or
association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual." Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, sec. 101,
§ 2(2), 61 Stat. 136, 137 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1988)). See generally JOHN
E. ABODEELY ET AL, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT 249-50 (rev. ed.
1981) (discussing the factors considered by the Board, prior to the 1974 amendment, to determine
the appropriate unit for collective bargaining).
39. See Flatbush Gen. Hosp., 126 N.L.R.B. 144, 145-46 (1960).
40. See Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266, 268 (1967).
41. See Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395, 395 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152

(1988)).
42. See S. 2292, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 119 CONG. REc. 26792 (1973).
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myriad occupational categories in the typical hospital would create an
unacceptable degree of fragmentation for purposes of collective bargaining.4 3 Under this view, smaller units would raise health care costs and
jeopardize patient care by increasing the number and scope of strikes,
stimulating jurisdictional disputes, and promoting whipsaw tactics in
bargaining. 44
Despite vigorous lobbying by health care employers (led by the
American Hospital Association (AHA)), this proposal was rejected, leaving the Act's provisions on bargaining unit determinations unchanged.
Nevertheless, both the Senate and House expressed solicitude for the employers' concern by including a statement in their respective committee
reports that "[d]ue consideration should be given by the Board to
preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry."4 5 For the next fifteen years, the health care employers, unions, and
the Board devoted significant resources to reconciling the Board's traditional discretion in the unit determination area with this piece of legisla46
tive history.
B.

The NonproliferationIssue and Unit Politics

Unit proliferation became a troublesome issue in health care cases
not only because industry concerns in the legislative process were addressed only obliquely through an agreed statement in the legislative history, but also because unit determinations generally involve high stakes.
Put most simply, larger, more heterogeneous units are harder to organize
than smaller, more homogeneous ones. Representation elections are frequently won and lost on the basis of the Board's unit determination. 47
Even after a union election victory, labor relations are often profoundly
affected by the employee configurations established at the unit determi48
nation stage.
It is not surprising, then, that hospitals pressed the view that the
legislative history statement, which became known as the "congressional
admonition," 49 was intended as a direction to the Board to confine itself,
to the greatest extent practical, to the four units specified in the failed
43. See ABODEELY, supra note 38, at 246-47.
44. See Coverage ofNonprofit HospitalsUnder NationalLabor RelationsAct, 1973: Hearingon
S. 794 and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 198-200 (1973) (testimony of the California Hospital Association).
45. S. REP. No. 7667, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974); accord H.R. REP. No. 1031, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1974); S. CONF. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
46. See ABODEELY, supra note 38, at 249-76.

47. Id. at 339.
48. See id
49. NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp. of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 414 (9th Cir. 1979).
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legislative provision. Nor was it surprising that health care unions strenuously resisted this construction of the legislative events, urging instead
that the Board pursue its traditional "community of interest" analysis in
making unit determinations. This division of views led to highly contentious litigation before the Board and the courts of appeals that, over time,
produced policy conflicts within the Board and divisions in the circuits.
The history of this litigation is lengthy and complex, 50 but its essence can
be captured by considering the Board's general approach to unit questions along with a few illustrations specific to the health care industry.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that representation of employees
for purposes of collective bargaining shall occur "in a unit appropriate
for such purposes." 5 1 Section 9(b) provides that the Board "shall decide
in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom
in exercising the rights guaranteed by [the Act], the unit appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof."52 The Supreme Court has held that
these broad directives vest the Board with wide discretion in determining
53
when a unit is appropriate.
In acting on an election petition, the Board traditionally decides
whether the petitioned-for employee group shares a sufficient "community of interest" to warrant designating those employees an appropriate
unit.54 "Community of interest" is a standard that takes account of a
number of factors:
(1) similarity in the scale and manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity in the qualifications, skills, and training of the
employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange among employees;
50. See ABODEELY, supra note 38, at 250-90; Kathleen A. Curran, Note, The NationalLabor
Relations Board's Proposed Rules on Health Care Bargaining Units, 76 VA. L. REv. 115, 127-44

(1990).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).

52. Md§ 159(b).
53. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 332 U.S. 111 (1944), the Supreme Court wrote:
Wide variations in the forms of employee self-organization and the complexities of
modem industrial organization make difficult the use of inflexible rules as the test of an
appropriate unit. Congress was informed of the need for shaping the unit to the particular
case and accordingly gave the Board wide discretion in the matter.
Id. at 134.
54. Under the NLRA, the unit need be only an appropriate unit, not the appropriate unit. See
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988). Thus, categories of employees may be grouped a number of different
ways and still satisfy the appropriateness requirement.
The immediate consequence of determining a unit to be appropriate is that the employees
within that unit will be the constituency in the representation election; the ultimate consequence is
that if the union prevails in the election, those employees will constitute a separate unit for purposes
of collective bargaining.

286
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(6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production
processes; (8) common supervision and determination of labor relations policy; (9) relationship to the administrative organization of the
employer; (10) history of collective bargaining; (11) desires
of the af55
fected employees; and (12) extent of union organization.
Application of the standard is formally based on detailed and intensive factual analysis, but the complexity of the standard itself and the
subtlety of some of its components tend to broaden, rather than constrain, the Board's exercise of discretion. These characteristics also invite protracted evidentiary presentations and fine legal distinctions. The
56
hearing process (and, in turn, the decisional product) is often prolix.
Nevertheless, over time, the body of decisions reflects common approaches to recurring issues that provide a substantial degree of predictability in unit determinations.
In the health care setting, the Board's treatment of two categories of
employees-registered nurses and skilled maintenance workers-illustrates the unit problem well. Shortly after the Health Care Amendments
became effective, the Board held that a unit consisting entirely of registered nurses (RNs) was appropriate given the RNs' work roles and professional separateness. 57 This decision and similar ones 8 finding
separate units for RNs to be appropriate, rather than including them in
"all professional" units, provoked judicial disapproval on the ground
that the Board had adopted a per se rule for RNs. This approach was
thought to be particularly objectionable in light of the "congressional
admonition" against unit proliferation. In NLRB v. St. FrancisHospital
of Lynwood,5 9 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded:
[This line ofl precedent contravenes that congressional admonition by
establishing an irrebuttable presumption in favor of certain units.
55. ROBERT A. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIvE BARGAINING 69
(1976); see also NLRB v. Purnell's Pride, Inc., 609 F.2d 1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980) (listing "bargaining history, operational integration, geographic proximity, common supervision, similarity in job
function, and degree of employee interchange" as relevant factors in determining "community of
interest").
56. See, e-g., Subrin, supra note 3:
In ascertaining the community of interest, the Board for over forty years has looked at
such factors as the nature of the work, skills and compensation of the employees, supervision, functional coherence, and geographical separation. Board volumes are replete with
decisions containing lengthy narratives as to whether the plant manager can hire or fire or
schedule or grant overtime, which parking lot or restrooms various groups use, how many
employees transferred into the unit from elsewhere in the plant, or which employees wear
common uniforms.
Id at 105-06 (footnote omitted).
57. See Mercy Hosps. of Sacramento, Inc., 217 N.L.R.B. 765, 766-68 (1975).
58. Eg., Ralph K. Davies Medical Ctr., 256 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1981); Brookwood Hosp., 252
N.L.R.B. 748 (1980); Lancaster Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n 246 N.L.R.B. 600 (1979); MorristownHamblem Hosp. Ass'n, 226 N.L.R.B. 76 (1976).
59. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).

Vol. 41:274]

NLRB'S FIRST R ULEMAKING

While Congress did not pass S.2292 which would have set up a uni-

form four unit for all non-profit hospitals, that failure does not sanction the Boards's establishment of its own more extensive five-unit
standard .... 60

Thereafter, the Board made explicit that its approach to RN petitions
was to apply its traditional "community of interest" standard on a caseby-case basis.6 1 The Board also asserted that its body of cases, predominantly finding separate RN units appropriate, was both consistent with
that standard and reflected sensitivity to the expressed congressional concern with unit proliferation.6 2
Despite the Board's effort to fit health care unit determinations into
its community of interest approach, the Ninth Circuit's assertion in St.
Francis Hospital of Lynwood that the "congressional admonition" required a "disparity of interest" approach gained growing judicial acceptance.6 3 Under this approach, only a demonstration that the interests of a
particular employee group (such as RNs) were disparate from a larger
grouping (such as "all professionals") would justify finding a separate
unit appropriate.6 In response, the Board made still another effort to
satisfy the courts that it was proceeding consistently with congressional
intent. Acting on a petition for a separate unit of skilled maintenance
workers in St. FrancisHospital1,65 the Board identified seven potentially
appropriate units: physicians, registered nurses, other professionals,
technical employees, business office clericals, service and maintenance
employees, and skilled maintenance employees.66 Only if a petition
sought one of these units would the Board proceed to the community of
interest analysis. This approach would thus respect non-proliferation
concerns by limiting the number of possible units to seven, while at the
same time preserving the community of interest standard. Before the St.
FrancisI approach had been subjected to judicial review, however, the
Board shifted course and, in St. FrancisHospital11,67 adopted essentially
60. IL at 414.
61. See Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 409, 411-15 (1980).
62. See id at 414.
63. See, eg., St. FrancisHospital, 601 F.2d at 419; Presbyterian/St. Lukes Medical Ctr. v.
NLRB, 653 F.2d 450, 456-57 (10th Cir. 1981) (requiring Board to "expressly consider congressional
admonition" and to "focus on the 'disparity of interests' ").
64. See Presbyterian/Sl Lukes, 653 F.2d at 457 n.6:
It is not the similarity of employees' training, hours, conditions and activities which determine the appropriateness of the unit. It is, rather the dissimilarity of interests relevant to
the collective bargaining process that determines which employees are not to be included in
a proposed unit. The proper approach is to begin with a broad proposed unit and then
exclude employees with disparate interests. One should not start with a narrow unit,...
and then add professionals with similar interests.
65. 265 N.L.R.B. 1025 (1982).
66. See id at 1029.
67. 271 N.L.R.B. 948 (1984).
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the disparity of interest test of the Ninth Circuit. 68 St. FrancisII was
also short-lived. Joining several other circuits that rejected the Ninth
Circuit's call for a "disparity of interest" test, 69 the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit held that the "congressional admonition" did not compel a disparity of interest approach and remanded the
case to the Board. 70 Thus, in early 1987 the Board found itself again
searching for an approach to health care bargaining unit determinations

that could command substantial judicial support. 71

C. St. Vincent Hospital: The Adjudication That Triggered
Rulemaking

The Board's initial response to its dilemma was to grant review and
set oral argument in St. Vincent Hospitaland Health Center,7 2 a post-St.
FrancisI1 case in which a regional director refused to find a separate RN
unit appropriate. On May 4, 1987, the Board heard argument on the
lingering issue of what test should be used for health care unit determinations, 73 including particularly the question of the significance of the legislative history of the Health Care Amendments of 1974.74 While St.
Vincent was under consideration, the Board abandoned its effort to formulate a health care unit policy through adjudication and instead turned
68. See id. at 953.
69. See NLRB v. Walker County Medical Ctr., Inc., 722 F.2d 1535, 1539 n.4 (lth Cir. 1984);
Watonwan Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983); Trustees of the
Masonic Hall & Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 641 (2d Cir. 1983).
70. See Electrical Workers Local 474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 714-15 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
71. The Board later described the conflict in the circuits:
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have held that the legislative history requires a "disparity-of-interests" analysis. Moreover, those circuits interpret the "disparity-of-interests" approach as sanctioning narrow units only if the differences in interests between the
employees in the unit sought and other employees are so great as virtually to preclude
organizing on a broader scale. Several other circuits, however, have rejected this rigid
"disparity-of-interests" approach, and have held instead that the Board may use a traditional "community-of-interests" analysis, provided it weighs the public interest in avoiding
unit proliferation against the employees' organizational rights. Other courts, while not
expressly rejecting the rigid "disparity-of-interests" approach, have adopted the view that
the Board must take the congressional admonition against unit proliferation into account
in making health care unit determinations. Most recently, in Electrical Workers IBEW
Local 474, the D.C. Circuit not only rejected the view that the amendments mandate the
use of a "disparity-of-interests" standard, but held that Congress' failure to amend Sec. 9 of
the Act (dealing with unit determinations) indicates that Congress implicitly approved the
continued use of the "community-of-interests" approach in health care institutions. (The
Court did indicate that the Board might, in its discretion, switch to a "disparity-of-interests" standard if it explained its action adequately.)
St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Ctr., 285 N.L.R.B. 365, 366 n.8 (1987) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 365. The decision to grant review was made on April 8, 1987. Id.
73. Id.
74. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (1988)).
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to rulemaking. The Board's deep frustration with the adjudicatory process on this issue was apparent in the language of its notice of proposed
rulemaking. After reviewing the history of litigation since the 1974
Amendments, the notice observed:
Thirteen years and many hundreds of cases later, the Board finds
that despite its numerous, well-intentioned efforts to carry out congressional intent through formulation of a general conceptual test, it is now
no closer to successfully defining appropriate
bargaining units in the
7
health care industry than it was in 1974. 5
Nearly two months later, the Board announced its decision in St. Vin-

cent. 76 The decision disposed of the case by continuing to apply its disparity-of-interest test, and it asserted that the D.C. Circuit in St. Francis
77
11 had simply misunderstood the Board's rationale for this approach.
At the same time, the Board pointed to the rulemaking it had begun as
its intended method for ultimately resolving the policy controversy. 78
The Board indicated its intention to continue to apply the disparity-of-

interest test until the rulemaking was concluded. 79
III.

THE RULEMAKING

In its incipient stage, the health care unit rulemaking presented
novel questions for the Board that would have been routine for agencies
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142, 25,143 (1987).
285 N.L.R.B. 365 (1987).
See id. at 367-69.
See id. at 365-66.
The Board explained its decision to continue applying current law as follows:
In the meantime, petitions will continue to be filed by labor organizations seeking to
represent health care employees, and the Board is faced with deciding how to deal with
those petitions while the rulemaking proceeding is pending. Three choices appear to be
available: to take no action on such petitions until the final rule is issued; to make determinations under some new interim standard; or to continue to decide cases under extant
Board law.
We reject the first option-deferring action pending issuance of the final rule-because it would leave the parties in limbo for an undetermined period of time-at least
several months. In our view, such a lengthy period of inaction certainly would not "assure
to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by the Act," and in
fact would deprive them of those rights until the final rule was issued. In addition, since
we have determined that the final rule will be prospective in application only, inaction
pending the outcome of the rulemaking proceeding would merely result in delay, and in
any event would not result in the final rule being applied to pending cases such as this.
We also choose not to process cases under any new interim standard, in part because
any such standard necessarily would be of brief duration, ending shortly after the final rule
was promulgated. Moreover, the oral argument persuades us that it would be advisable to
obtain empirical evidence before devising a new standard. Lastly, an interim standard
would add unnecessarily to the adjustments petitioners and employers must make as the
Board moves from case-by-case adjudication to rulemaking.
Therefore, we have decided to continue to process cases under existing law until the
final rule has been issued. That is, we will continue to make bargaining unit determinations
in the health care industry using the "disparity-of-interests" analysis announced in St.
Francis II, and which we have applied in subsequent cases.
St 'Vincent, 285 N.L.R.B. at 366 (footnotes omitted).
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that regularly use notice and comment rulemaking. Most of these questions concerned the Board's authority to engage in rulemaking for unit
determinations or basic rulemaking procedure. Other questions reflected
the uniqueness of this undertaking for the Board; some of these warrant
attention before turning to the questions of authority and procedure.
A.

The Rationalefor Rulemaking

The decision to proceed by rulemaking was made at a Board meeting on May 15, 1987,80 ten days after the oral argument in St. Vincent.
Board members Babson, Stephens, and Cracraft voted in favor of proceeding by rulemaking; 8 ' Chairman Dotson and Member Johansen voted
against.8 2 Thus, even at the point the Board committed itself to rulemaking, there was sharp division as to the desirability of proceeding in this
fashion. The transcript of this open meeting provides an interesting perspective on just how fundamental the decision was given traditional
Board practice and procedure. The exchanges from the transcript are
part of a unique informal record of the views of Board members at a
critical juncture in the Board's history.
Some of the explanations offered by the Board members for their
positions reflected a fundamental disagreement about the purpose and
possible value of rulemaking:
ChairmanDotson: What would we expect to learn in this process
that we don't already know through the litigation, oral arguments that
have taken place?
Member Babson: That's like asking what is it that we don't know.
It's hard to say.
ChairmanDotson: Well, I'm wondering what conceivably could
there be that would come forward in this process that would not have
come forward in these other procedures? What kind of information?
Member Babson: I don't know that any of us can answer that
question, Don, but as I understand the process, it provides the opportunity for any interested party, anybody arguably affected by the rule
to come forward to provide us with information, some of which we
may have already seen in the context of our case-by-case adjudication.... It is impossible for us to state here and now, what is it we do

not know until we give people the opportunity to tell us....
Member Stephens: Well, it seems to me that the thrust of the brief
of the American Hospital Association [in St. Vincent's] was that there
has been this dynamic revolution in the hospital industry since 1974 so
that things are much more highly integrated among the professions
than ever before. And it seems to me that underneath that argument is
80. Transcript of Meeting of the NILRB, May 15, 1987, at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also St. Vincent Hospital, 285 N.L.R.B. at 365 n.6.
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the point that now more than ever there may be an increased risk of
proliferation even with just more than a couple of units.... I don't
think we could take cognizance of that argument in an adjudication
because that's not evidence that's in the record. . . . I think, in a
rulemaking proceeding, in the hearing, and if other parties want to
respond to that they should be given the chance to talk about what the
current state of affairs in the healthcare industry is....
ChairmanDotson: In that context, those things tend to be more
assertions whereas in the adjudicatory process it takes the form of record evidence. I feel more comfortable with record evidence and if
these changes occur they will be reflected in the cases we receive
83
later.
This disagreement over the usefulness of rulemaking became even
more contentious when the discussion turned to the question of whether
to include a specific proposal in the notice of proposed rulemaking or
merely to indicate an intent to make a rule on the subject of health care
units:
MemberBabson: I would propose that the initial promulgation be
a proposed rule that specifies proposed units in various sizes and kinds
of healthcare institutions versus or as opposed to simply soliciting
comments ab initio without any suggested delineation of units.
Member Johansen: My only comment again would be I would
think that if we are going to recommend what appropriate units are,
and we're going to say we're doing this because [we] rely upon our
expertise and knowledge we have gained, that we just list.., the units
we have been going by.... That gives some credence to the statement
that all these 13 years we have gained all this knowledge and this is
what we think is appropriate....
Mr. Subrin [Director of the Office of Representation Appeals]: I
think you would be much better off to deviate a little bit from what you
have done in the past, otherwise the unions are going to come rushing
in and they are going to see this as your way of codifying and putting
in granite the units that they have fought tooth and nail against....
And by deviating a little bit, then if you ultimately decide to
scratch... [a] unit because.., it would be proliferative... that would
also make more credible that you listened to what was said in the
hearing.
Chairman Dotson: That strikes me as a little cynical....
Member Stephens: I don't see anything cynical about this....
ChairmanDotson: Isn't it a fact that we appear to have a majority now in favor of giving the registered nurses a separate unit? And
that this is a convoluted way to go about it?
83. Transcript of Meeting of the NLRB, May 15, 1987, at 20-22.
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Member Stephens: No, I don't think that's the case at all. Some
people might perceive it that way, that might be your view, but that's
not my view.
Member Babson: It's not my view either. That's a cynical view.
What we're doing is that we're providing a basis for discussion and for
those who are concerned about prejudgment .... any time that we put
out a draft with some specifics in it, I suppose we're a candidate for
being accused of prejudging ....
ChairmanDotson: I'm struck by the fact that in the oral arguments the representatives of both the employers and the unions showed
no enthusiasm for going into rulemaking at this point and were much
more concerned about the Board getting on with the decisionmaking
process and getting cases decided.... And I have not been able to see
how changing the format of the decision changes the ultimate decision
or is going to change what is laid before us. The principal difference I
can see here is delay and confusion.
Member Stephens: Well, I don't see that. I don't see how it's
going to be any more confusing or more delay-prone than the current
84
state of affairs
The Board members also disagreed on the implications of an initial
rule proposal on ongoing adjudications:
Member Babson: Well, if we did it the way Jim [Stephens] suggested then it should be clear to everyone that during the interim period that we will continue to adjudicate cases on a case-by-case basis
according to whatever disposition we make in the St. Vincent case....
And, if parties choose to wait until the rulemaking process is completed, that's their business ....
Member Cracraft: ... I think we will see people citing the proposed rule saying this unit is appropriate because it conforms to the
proposed rule.
Member Stephens: Well, we'll know what weight to give to that.
...

We're making the decision. 85

In the end the discussion returned to the fundamental question of
the utility of rulemaking.
Chairman Dotson: As I understand it, you don't really know
what you want to do about these units and you believe that rulemaking
will allow you to better decide what you want to do with these units.
Member Stephens: That's a loaded question. If you're going to
accuse us of not knowing what we're doing, I think it's fair to say that
this is a useful starting place ....
84. Id. at 24-31.
85. Id. at 34-35.
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Chairman Dotson: I didn't say that you didn't know what you

were doing. I said, do I understand correctly that you are undecided
as to what to do?
Member Stephens: Well, that's a different question and I think
that it's fair to say that we are ultimately undecided. This is a useful
starting point.
Chairman Dotson: And you believe that the rulemaking proce-

dure will somehow provide you with something we don't already have
from the Congressional hearings and the previous litigation and the

oral arguments and the many briefs that have been filed.
Member Stephens: That's right.... And, hopefully, I think the

leap of faith that we are making here is that this will facilitate the
administration of the Act. And, the fact that we cannot empirically

demonstrate that, I don't think should deter us .... 86
Although the transcript cannot be expected to reflect completely the
factors that underlay the judgment of individual Board members to support or to oppose rulemaking, the discussion reveals at least some attention to a number of issues that have surrounded calls for greater Board
use of rulemaking: (1) whether rulemaking would stimulate the submission of useful empirical data or would simply attract the same generalized legal/policy arguments heard in adjudications; (2) whether the data
that might be submitted would provide as reliable a basis for policymaking as the evidence that is admitted and tested through cross-examination
in adjudications; (3) whether loss of the assumed sensitivity of case-bycase consideration would be offset by the assumed speed and efficiency of
a generalized approach; (4) whether the process of proposing and possibly modifying proposed rules calls into question or enhances the concept
of Board expertise; (5) whether the Board's regulated constituencies
would find rulemaking credible and participate; and (6) whether the
Board could continue to adjust policy through adjudication having undertaken rulemaking.
The Board discussion in this meeting, as well as in one further public meeting,8 7 translated into a two-part rationale for proceeding with
rulemaking, set out in the notice of proposed rulemaking in 1987.88
First, after briefly reviewing the unstable and litigious background of
health care unit determinations, 89 NPR I suggested that there would be
value in obtaining empirical data from a range of affected parties on the
effect of unit configuration on labor relations in the health care industry. 90 Second, it asserted that the Board's thirteen-year experience with
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 36-37.
See Transcript of Meeting of the NLRB, June 9, 1987.
See NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987).
See supra text accompanying notes 57-71.
NPR I read:
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health care units reflected much commonality among health care facilities that led to "predictable groupings" of employees and provided the
basis for proposing a specific rule for consideration. 91 NPR I also noted
the longstanding criticism the Board had received from commentators
for its reluctance to use rulemaking as a policymaking vehicle. 92 The
rationale concluded with the Board's opinion that "rulemaking, though
perhaps time consuming at the outset, will be a valuable long-term
investment, paying dividends in the form of predictability, efficiency, and
more enlightened determinations as to viable appropriate units ....,,93
B.

The Authority for Rulemaking

Section 6 of the NLRA expressly grants the Board rulemaking
authority. 94 Thus, the general authority of the Board to engage in
It is clear to us that the key element in the Board's avoidance of proliferation is to
designate how many units will be deemed appropriate in a particular type of health care
facility. In so doing, the Board must effectuate section 7 rights by permitting bargaining in
cohesive units, units with interests both shared within the group and disparate from those
possessed by others; weighed against this must be Congress' expressed desire to avoid
proliferation in order to avoid disruption in patient care, unwarranted unit fragmentation
leading to jurisdictional disputes and work stoppages, and increased costs due to whipsaw
strikes and wage leapfrogging. Though the Board has of times made broad generalizations
as to which types of unit configurations would or would not lead to proliferation and the
catalogue of undesired results, it... has never obtained empirical data on these matters.
This, along with the still unsettled state of the Board's past, doctrinal efforts after so many
years, is [one of the] major reasons for the Board's deciding to engage in rulemaking.
52 Fed. Reg. at 25,143.
91. NPR I states:
Another major reason [for the rulemaking] is a reflection of the Board's extensive
experience. The Board has in the last 13 years received many hundreds of petitions for
health care units. Generally, the units requested have been in approximately six, predictable groupings: registered nurses, other professional employees, technical employees, business office clerical employees, service and maintenance employees, and skilled maintenance
employees. Only occasionally have units of guards or physicians been sought. It is our
observation that these groups of employees generally exhibit the same internal characteristics, and relationship to other groups of employees, in one health care facility as do like
groups of employees at other facilities. To put the matter another way, the various health
care facilities we have examined over the years have looked very much the same as other
facilities of the same type: large acute care hospitals, small acute care hospitals, and nursing homes.
Id at 25,143-44.
92. The Board cited most of the critical commentary in the literature. See id. at 25,144 n.33;
see also supra note 3. At one point, the Board fully quoted one of the bluntest expressions of
criticism:
"Rather than providing a basis for decisions that only a supposedly expert agency
could make-by evaluating the available empirical, economic literature and systematically
distilling the accumulated experience of Board personnel and of the labor relations community generally-the Board acts as a kind of Article I "Talmudist" court, parcing precedent,
divining the true meaning of some Supreme Court ruling, and balancing in some mysterious fashion competing, yet absolute-sounding values."
NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,143 (quoting Estreicher, supra note 3, at 172).
93. NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,144.
94. Section 6 provides that "ihe Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the APA], such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of this subehapter." 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1988).
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rulemaking was not in doubt. The section 9(b) directive to the Board to
determine appropriate units, however, provides in part: "The Board
shall decide in each case whether.., the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof ... .,,19
Anticipating arguments that the "in
each case" language precluded the use of rulemaking for unit questions,
NPR I set out the basis for the Board's contrary view.
First, the notice quoted in full Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's emphatic conclusion that the language could not have been intended to have
such effect:
Do the words "in each case" mean that the Board is prohibited from
classifying problems, from developing rules or principles, or from relying on precedent cases which establish narrow or broad propositions?
The answer has to be clearly no; the Board may decide "in each case"
with the help of such classifications, rules, principles, and precedents
as it finds useful. The mandate to decide "in each case" does not prevent the Board from supplanting the original discretionary chaos with
some degree of order, and the principal instruments for regularizing
the system of deciding "in each case" are classifications, rules, principles, and precedents. Sensible men could not refuse, to use such
in96
struments and a sensible Congress would not expect them to.
The Notice then referred to both judicial and scholarly observations that
the unit determination process could benefit particularly from rulemaking by providing a vehicle for obtaining and evaluating empirical data
concerning how various unit configurations affect bargaining.97 Finally,
it offered examples of the sort of empirical questions participants in the
rixlemaking process might address. 98
95. Id. § 159(b) (emphasis added).
96. NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,144 (quoting KENNETH C. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TEcr 145 (3d ed. 1972)).
It is interesting to note that the scholarly commentary that encouraged the Board to make
greater use of its rulemaking authority, including the view of Professor Davis, was the subject of
discussion in the second open meeting at which the content of NPR I was discussed:
Mr. Babson: I don't think for example, that the document should suggest that the
only reason why we are engaging in rulemaking, is because all these distinguished commentators think that we should. I think that the Board in its judgment, in its collective wisdom, I think that we are aware of this commentary.
Much of it is well taken. But, really, the impetus for the decision is that there is, I
think, a view that it will benefit the agency; that the time has come to try to avoid some of
the relitigation that we have experienced.
That is not to say that [the commentary] needn't be referred to. I think that we can
probably refer to it, but, I don't think that the reason that we are doing it is because we
were all in law school at some time when Kenneth Davis was criticizing the NLRB for not
engaging in rulemaking.
Transcript of Meeting of the NLRB, June 9, 1987, at 10-11.
97. See NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,145.
98. See id The Board described its interest as follows:
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Ultimately, the "in each case" language became the basis for one of
the three major legal arguments made in challenging the final rule. 99 The
initial notice of proposed rulemaking addressed this potential issue only
in the limited fashion described above. This may have been the product
of a view that the issue was not a particularly significant one or that the
notice of proposed rulemaking was not the proper vehicle for fully setting
forth an agency's position on a legal question.

C. The Terms of the ProposedRule
The rule proposed in NPR I covered only acute care hospitals and
nursing homes, thus excluding such facilities as psychiatric hospitals, for
which unit determinations would continue to be made on a case-by-case
basis. The proposed rule provided in pertinent part:
(a) With respect to employees of "health care institutions" as defined in section 2(14) of the Act, no petition for initial organization
shall be entertained, except under extraordinary circumstances, if the
petition seeks certification in a bargaining unit not in substantial accordance with the provisions of this rule. The following shall be the
only appropriate units, except that any combination will also be appropriate, as the union's option and so long as the requirements of section
9(b) (1) and (3) [governing professionals and guards] are met:
(1) Appropriate units in large, acute care hospitals, which shall
be defined as all acute care hospitals having more than 100
patient beds:
(i) All registered nurses.
(ii) All professionals except for registered nurses and
physicians.
(ii) All physicians.
The Board wants to learn how various bargaining units affect legitimate concerns of both
unions and health care employers. For example, when registered nurses have been grouped
with other professionals, have their interests been properly represented? Has the bargaining, when it has occurred in all-professional groups, nonetheless proceeded on the basis of
each separate profession? Have wage rates been negotiated separately despite the all-professional units? When they have existed, have separate professional groupings resulted in
interruption in the delivery of health care? Wage whipsawing? Jurisdictional disputes?
These are merely examples of the types of questions that should be addressed by anyone
testifying for or against separate units, such as registered nurses, business office clericals,
technicals, maintenance employees, etc. The Board is not seeking at the oral hearings the
"opinions" and further legal arguments of counsel, which may be submitted as comments,
but, rather, actual, empirical, practical evidence offered by industry and union representatives who have themselves participated in or observed bargaining in the health care industry in various configurations. The Board also desires evidence from witnesses with direct
knowledge about any recent changes in the delivery of health care, such as cost containment, allegedly greater integration of function between categories of health care employees,
and changes in function of specific classifications of health care employees, including
greater or lesser degrees of specialization, that may have an impact on the question of
appropriate units.

IdL
99. See, ag., Brief for Petitioner at 13-25, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S.Ct. 1539
(1991) (No. 90-97).
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(iv) All technical employees.
(v) All service, maintenance and clerical employees except
for guards.

(vi) All guards.
(2) Appropriate units in small, acute care hospitals, which shall
be defined as all acute care hospitals having 100 patient beds or
fewer [and all nursing homes]:
(i) All professional employees.
(ii) All technical employees.
(iii) All service, maintenance and clerical employees except
for guards.

(iv) All guards.100
The proposed rule thus distinguished between large and small hospi-

tals by providing for six units in the former and only four in the latter. 101
The notice asserted that these units reflected the groupings of employees

across a broad range of health care facilities and that these groups were
essentially "predictable" from the body of Board adjudications since the
Health Care Amendments, and thus the proposed rule reflected the
Board expertise developed over a period of thirteen years.102 After
providing a brief explanation for each unit, the notice indicated that the

restrictively
"extraordinary circumstances" exception would be applied
10 3
to accomplish the litigation-reducing purpose of the rule.
D.

The Procedurefor the Rulemaking

Although the notice and comment procedures of section 553 of the
APA would have required only an opportunity for written comments on
the proposed rule,'0 the Board decided for a variety of reasons to hold
100. NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,149.
101. The Board explained:
The Board has tentatively decided, based on its experience, that larger hospitals, with
their larger numbers of employees in each category, may warrant one or two additional
units. In smaller facilities, it is likely that employees will have more contacts with one
another, may to some extent perform one another's work, and generally may share interests more than groupings in larger hospitals. A slightly lesser degree of specialization
seems also probable. Recognizing that perfection is impossible in this area, but also being
intent on not litigating the precise boundaries of the "small hospital" in each case, the
Board has tentatively determined that acute care hospitals of more than 100 patient beds
will be deemed "large"; acute care hospitals of 100 patient beds or fewer will be deemed
"small."
Id. at 25,146.
102. See id. at 25,144; see also Appendix B, "Results of Case-by-Case Adjudications" (Board
submission at Sept. 14, 1987 hearing).
103. NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,145. The Board stated: "Though an 'extraordinary circumstances' exception has been included, it is anticipated that the exception will be little used and limited to truly extraordinary situations; the exception is to be construed narrowly and is not intended
to provide an opportunity (or loophole) for redundant litigation." Id.
104. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) ("After notice required by this section, the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without the opportunity for oral presentation.") (emphasis added);
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public hearings, to receive oral and written comments, and to permit limited cross-examination.10 5 First, and perhaps most important, was the
desire to assure affected parties that there would be the fullest opportunity to participate as the Board undertook a new method of policy formulation.10 6 Second, there was some concern that without oral
testimony and cross-examination, the Board would receive through written submissions only legal arguments of the kind it traditionally heard in
adjudications.10 7 Third, the notion of a contested proceeding, with one
group of participants testing the positions of the opposing participants,
was consistent with the model of labor-management relations the Board
and its constituencies generally accepted.10 8 Finally, there was a view
that, in this novel undertaking, the Board should minimize the likelihood
of legal challenge to the action on procedural grounds. 1 9
Hearings were scheduled and held at three locations: Washington,
D.C., on August 17 and 18, 1987; Chicago on August 31 and September
1, 1987; and San Francisco on September 14-16, 1987.110 The objective
was to permit the widest opportunity for participation through geographical dispersion of the hearing venues. A fourth hearing was later held in
Washington, D.C. on October 7-9 and 13-16, 1987. The initial comment
period was scheduled to end October 30, 1987 (120 days after the initial
notice),"' but was extended three times.' 12
After establishing the preliminary procedural requirements for gaining access to the hearing," 3 NPR I outlined the procedure for the
hearings:
see also American Trucking Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 319-20 (1953); SCHWARTZ, supra
note 6, at 196.
105. Interviews, supra note 9.

106. Id.
107. Id
108. Id
109. Id.
110. See NPR , 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,148 (scheduling opening day of each hearing).
111. See id
112. See Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988)
[hereinafter NPR II] (second notice of proposed rulemaking).
113. Preliminarily, NPR I prescribed:
Persons wishing to present oral testimony at any one of the specified locations should notify the Office of the Executive Secretary... no later than July 24, 1987, advising it of the
location at which the witness wishes to testify. Thereafter, all witnesses should submit to
the Executive Secretary ... eight copies of either the written text or a summary of their
presentations no later than 1 week prior to the commencement of the hearing at which they
wish to testify. Copies of these texts and summaries will be placed in the docket ... and
will be available at the Executive Secretary's Office, and also at the hearing location where
the witness intends to testify, for examination by interested persons.
52 Fed. Reg. at 25,148.
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An administrative law judge will preside over the hearings, which
will be informal, legislative-type proceedings at which there are no formal pleadings or adverse parties. In general, oral presentations from
individual witnesses will be limited to 20 minutes each, except that the
presiding judge may impose a greater or lesser period, at the judge's
discretion, if he or she deems it appropriate. Participants may desire
to ask questions or [sic] crucial issues following a presentation. Such
questions may be permitted by the judge, limited to approximately 15
minutes per questioner.... The judge shall have discretion to modify
the time for questioning, and shall have further discretion to impose
other guidelines for the orderly and efficient conduct of the
hearing....
The Board will be represented at the hearings by a member of its
staff. The judge and the Board representative shall have the right to
question persons making an
oral presentation as to their testimony and
1 14
any other relevant matter.
The Board assigned senior Administrative Law Judge Bernard Ries to

the hearings. Judge Ries thereafter periodically refined the procedural
guidelines for the rulemaking, in consultation with the participants and
in light of developments at the hearings. 115
At the first Washington hearing, twenty witnesses appeared and 496
pages of testimony were taken.k1 6 At the Chicago hearing, twenty-seven
witnesses appeared and 521 pages of testimony were taken.1 17 At the San
Francisco hearing, thirty-nine witnesses appeared and 762 pages of testimony were taken.118 Finally, at the second Washington hearing, fiftyeight witnesses appeared and 1766 pages of testimony were taken. 19 The
witnesses included employees in most of the job classifications at issue,
national and local union officials representing these employee groups,
health care employers, representatives of health care trade associations
and professional organizations, and individual health care professionals
and academics.1 20
114. Id.
115. For example, the judge undertook to adjust the time requirements for advance submission
of comments to accommodate the participants' needs and sought to develop groupings of similarly
situated participants to minimize repetitive questioning in the hearings.
116. NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,900.
117. Id
118. Id
119. Id.
120. Id. Accommodating the large number of witnesses, and participants interested in crossexamining witnesses, posed various problems for the presiding judge. The published procedurerequiring written statements in advance, limiting time for presentation and cross-examination, and
grouping representatives with common interests-proved somewhat difficult to implement. It was
clear from the procedural charter that the Board intended the judge to perform only a traffic control
function, and that it wanted participants to have as much flexibility in making their presentations as
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Clearly, the choice of oral hearings did provide the opportunity for
broad participation. Unions, particularly those with the most at stake, 121
participated more actively and more thoroughly in the proceedings than
did health care management representatives. 122 Some of the unions
presented testimony that included empirical data on the effect of unit
configuration on health care labor relations, particularly in regard to
strike activity 123 The industry testimony was not as empirically oriented
and relied heavily on general policy arguments and legal issues related to
the "congressional admonition." 124 Although the Board had some initial
concern that either side might choose not to participate substantially in a
rulemaking, 25 it is not entirely clear why management's participation
was more limited than that of the unions.
A number of explanations are possible. Any rule establishing standard health care units would to some extent constrain litigation opportunities for management in resisting unionization and, in turn, would likely
speed the certification process. Moreover, the particular units proposed
in NPR I were simply more numerous than those that the unions had
sometimes been able to achieve through litigation. It is thus possible that
some health care industry components assumed, given the division in the
Board on the question of whether even to proceed to rulemaking, that the
more limited the participation, the less likely the Board would ever issue
a final rule. Similarly, if the industry assumed that the Board was firmly
committed to the units set forth in the initial proposal, some may have
reasoned that active management participation would only lend credibility to a proceeding that would not lead to a favorable result from the
industry perspective. On the other hand, the unions may have assumed
reasonably possible. The judge's supervisory functions were limited to the development of the hearing record; the Board staff supervised the development of the non-hearing record. Thus, in organizing the hearings and ruling on time requests and opportunities for questioning, the judge's approach
was generous. While multiple hearings at multiple locations enhanced the opportunity for participation, it also created certain scheduling and traveling problems, especially for participants who felt it
necessary to participate at each location. Finally, although the opportunity for questioning (crossexamination) gave the hearings and ultimately the record a richer character, it necessarily extended
the time required to complete the hearings. Ultimately, given the tolerant standard applied, some of
the questioning (like some of the underlying presentations) contributed only marginally to the value
of the record.
121. Among the most active participants were unions representing registered nurses and skilled
maintenance workers. Interviews, supra note 9.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id
125. See id. Some Board members had informal conversations with union and management
representatives to determine whether the parties would participate actively in a rulemaking if one
were undertaken.
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that the initial proposal was the deceptive opening gambit in a proceeding intended to lock in the more restrictive unit position the Board had
taken in recent years, and that their active participation was therefore
essential as a defensive matter. Both sides might also have perceived the
initiation of the proceeding as offering something of an olive branch to
unions that had come to believe that the Board was increasingly hostile
to their interests. How this might have affected participation is uncertain. It is clear, however, that the very uniqueness of the proceeding for
the Board undoubtedly encouraged speculation on both sides as to the
significance of the undertaking, and thus may have affected the vigor of
participation.
E. The Productof the Initial Comment Period and NPR II
During the four hearings, 144 witnesses testified, producing a combined transcript of 3545 pages. 126 Additionally, the Board received 315
written comments totalling approximately 1500 pages. 127 The Board indicated in the second notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR II) that it was
"gratified at, and appreciative of, the interest shown in these proceedings" and that it was "now far better qualified to resolve the issues
raised." 128 NPR II, which covered thirty-six pages in the Federal Register, comprehensively reviewed the rulemaking record. In addition to addressing the substantive issues related to health care unit determinations,
NPR II reaffirmed the desirability of proceeding by rulemaking. The
notice emphasized the relatively uniform Board approach to health care
units in adjudications and the considerable similarity among health care

institutions. 129
Most importantly, the second notice made a number of changes in
the initially proposed rule and provided a detailed explanation based on
126. NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,900 (1988).

127. Id.
128. Id. at 33,900-01.
129. See id at 33,903. The Board observed:
Our adjudicatory decisions as to appropriate units in the health care industry, where the
facts of each case were painstakingly examined in numerous lengthy and costly representation case proceedings, have been remarkably uniform in results, varying only when the
Board changed doctrinal formulations, e.g., from "community" to "disparity" of interests.
Thus, for example, from 1975 to 1984, despite lengthy adjudicatory proceedings the Board
found RN units appropriate in 24 out of 25 published cases; technical units appropriate in
18 out of 18 cases; business office clerical units appropriate in S out of 8 cases; etc. Though
adjudication led to varying results for skilled maintenance units, that was largely a function
of a single Board member, Member Jenkins, reaching different results on different records.
Other members were, individually, remarkably uniform, despite alleged differences in the
records. E.g., Member and Chairman Fanning found the separate maintenance unit appropriate 29 out of 29 times; Chairman Murphy, 26 out of 26 times. Continuing to determine
appropriate units in this way seems unproductive, especially considering the lack of universal judicial approval of any single doctrinal approach.

Id. (citations omitted).
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the rulemaking record for each change and for each component of the
revised rule. 130 The notice also provided for an additional comment period "[b]ecause this is the Board's first major effort at substantive
rulemaking, and because the Board is desirous of giving all interested
parties a further opportunity to comment on the proposed rules, including the substantial revisions .... ,131
The revised proposed' rule eliminated the large-small hospital distinction, observing that "[t]he vast majority of representatives of both
unions and employers appeared to agree that hospital size is not well
correlated with integration or division of labor, and opposed a rule differentiating between large and small hospitals."1 32 The revision also limited
coverage of the rule to acute care hospitals, thus excluding nursing
homes because "there are not only substantial differences between nursing homes and hospitals but also significant differences between the vari133
ous types of nursing homes which affect staffing patterns and duties."
Most significantly, having eliminated the special provisions for smaller
hospitals, the revision increased the number of appropriate units for all
hospitals from six to eight, carving out separate units for "skilled maintenance employees" and "business office clericals," and leaving a possible
134
residual unit of "all non-professional employees."
130. See id.
131. Id at 33,901 (citing Mark D. Shepard, Note, The Need for an AdditionalNotice and Comment Period When Final Rules Differ Substantiallyfrom Interim Rules, 1981 DUKE L.J. 377).
132. Id at 33,927.
133. Id at 33,927-29.
134. Id at 33,933. The Board explained that the changes were based on the empirical evidence
adduced during the initial comment period considered in light of a range of factors traditionally
considered in unit analysis and in light of the congressional admonition concerning proliferation of
units. See id at 33,904-06. The Board observed:
Although under rulemaking we shall attempt to avoid the doctrinal formulations utilized under adjudication, many of the factors we consider will be similar. Thus, among the
factors to be considered will be uniqueness of function; training, education and licensing;
wages, hours and working conditions; supervision; employee interaction; and factors relating to collective bargaining, such as bargaining history, matters of special concern, etc.
Location and scope of the job market may be relevant: i.e., whether the classification is
part of a job market external to the facility or even to health care, or rather shares a job
market with others in the facility or, perhaps, in the areawide health care community; job
market is a factor not extensively considered under adjudication, probably because evidence regarding it is not likely to be introduced during the litigation of a particular case.
In addition to these factors, should the evidence reveal the possibility of a separate unit, we
shall examine the likelihood that such a separate unit would result in interruption in the
delivery of health care, wage whipsawing, or jurisdictional disputes, matters with which
Congress expressed concern during the deliberations that preceded the 1974 amendments.
The emphasis, during our rulemaking deliberations, has been and will be on the empirical-what, according to the mass of evidence presented, is warranted and will facilitate
collective bargaining without jeopardizing the public interest-as opposed to prior, more
doctrinal, more conceptually oriented, determinations. We are confident we are now a
better informed administrative body in exercising the substantial discretion which we possess in the area of unit determinations.
Id at 33905-06 (citations omitted).
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Although the increase in the number of units from six to eight was
the only truly controversial change in the amended proposal, it was consistent with certain adjudicated unit determinations and was well-supported by evidence presented in the initial comment period. 135 Thus, it
appears the Board could reasonably have adopted the changes at that
point and announced a final rule. The Board formally explained its decision not to do so in terms of the novelty of the proceeding and the desire
to provide the fullest opportunity for participation. 136 As a result, over
six months elapsed between the second notice and the adoption of the
final rule, which was essentially the same as the revised rule in the second
notice. Given the unclarity of the law on the need for additional comment periods, 137 however, the Board's caution in seeking a second round
of comments seems understandable in its initial encounter with substantive rulemaking.
Nevertheless, procedural caution may not fully explain the decision
to solicit further comments. When the decision to issue a second notice
of proposed rulemaking allowing an additional comment period was
made on July 1, 1988, the Board consisted of four members: Babson,
Cracraft, Johansen and Stephens. Chairman Dotson had resigned effective December 16, 1987. Moreover, Member Babson, who was part of
the initial 3-2 majority that decided to undertake rulemaking, had already announced his resignation from the Board effective July 31,
1988.138 Thus, at this crucial juncture in the proceeding, the Board was
about to have its membership reduced to three, only two of whom supported the rulemaking. Member Babson's participation in the vote to
continue the proceeding created a 3-1 majority for going forward with
135. See, e.g., Results of Case-by.Case Adjudications (AppropriateUnits in the Health Care Industry) (submission by the National Labor Relations Board, Office of Representation Appeals at the

September 14, 1987 hearing in San Francisco summarizing adjudicated unit determinations concerning separate RN units, technical units, maintenance units, and office clerical units).
136. See NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,901.
137. See NPR I, 52 Fed. Reg. at 25,142.
138. The following table describes the Board composition during the rulemaking proceeding:
TABLE
Board Composition During Rulemaking
Member
Began
NPR I
NPR II
Final Rule
Ended
Name
Service
7-2-87
9-1-88
4-21-89
Service
DOTSON
3-7-83
X
12-16-87
JOHANSEN
5-28-85
X
X
X
6-15-89
BABSON
7-1-85
X
n1
7-31-88
STEPHENS
11-1-85
X
X
X
continues
CRACRAFI
11-14-86
X
X
X
continues
HIGGINS
8-29-88
n2
X
11-22-89
DEVANEY
11-22-88
X
continues
nI Participated in vote to issue NPR II (7-1-88)
n2 Did not participate in vote to issue NPR II (7-1-88)
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the rulemaking, while not committing the Board to a final rule that
might have been supported by only a 2-1 majority at the time of publication. Whether this was actually a factor in the Board's decision to provide an additional comment period is not as important as the fact that
the changes in the composition of the Board not only posed the usual
prospect for substantive policy shifts, but also threatened to undermine
139
the decision to undertake rulemaking.
One other possible Board motivation in providing an additional
comment period deserves mention. NPR II certified that the rulemaking
would comply with the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 14°
NPR I did not contain a Regulatory Flexibility Act certification. The
desire to correct this omission might, in part, have motivated an additional comment period.141
F.

The FinalRule

The notice of adoption of a final rule was published on April 21,
1989.142 It indicated that the Board had received approximately 1500
comments during the additional comment period; roughly thirty supported the proposed rule in whole or part, while roughly 1465 opposed
it.143 It also indicated that approximately one-half of the 1465 comments
in opposition to the rule were form letters, "for the most part containing
brief arguments without supporting detail." 144 The notice explained that
139. In the Final Rule notice the Board indicated that an argument had been made in the second

comment period that it should not promulgate a final rule without a full complement of Board
members. The notice explained further that the issue was now moot inasmuch as there was a full
complement. See Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336, 16,337 (1989).
140. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1988). The certification in NPR II read as follows:
As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. [§§ ]601[-612 (1988)], the
Board certifies that the proposed rule will not have a significant economic impact on small
entities. Prior to this rule, parties before the Board were required to litigate the appropriateness of a unit for election purposes if they could not reach agreement on the issue.
Upon enactment of this rule, parties will no longer be required to engage in litigation to
determine the appropriateness of units, thereby saving all parties the expense of litigation
before the Board and the courts. To the extent that organization of employees for the
purpose of collective bargaining will be fostered by this rule, thereby requiring small entities to bargain with unions, and that employees may thereby exercise rights under the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. [§§ ]151[-168 (1988)]), the Board
notes that such was and is Congress' purpose in enacting the Act and the health care
amendments thereto.
NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,934.
141. The final rule reaffirmed this certification. See Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. at 16,346.
142. See id. at 16,336.
143. Id
144. Id The Board elaborated:

The most common form letter, submitted by over 600 correspondents, briefly exhorts
the Board to return to the case-by-case approach and to find appropriate only two units, all
professionals and all nonprofessionals, plus the st~tutorily-inandated separate unit of
guards. Otherwise, say these commenters, their ability to provide comprehensive, coordinated care would be adversely affcted..... The form letter contains blank spaces for such
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generally the additional comments "mirror[ed] those made during earlier
points in the rulemaking" and listed nineteen categories into which the
arguments fell. 145 From this grouping the Board separated those issues it
believed it had dealt with thoroughly in NPR I and NPR II from new
issues that were dealt with separately in the final notice.1 4 6 With one
exception, the latter arguments related to the substance of the rule.
The exception was contained in a section entitled Rulemaking, in
which the Board for the first time thoroughly addressed the argument
that the "in each case" language of section 9(b) of the Act precluded the
use of rulemaking for unit determinations. 147 The section referred to the
legislative history of the provision, and to the commentary arguing
against this construction of the statute. 148 It also noted that the Board's
adjudicative decisions in unit cases effectively created "rules" of general
applicability to determine appropriate units. 49 Moreover, for the first
time in the rulemaking, the Board referred to Heckler v. Campbell,150 a
Supreme Court decision upholding the authority of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to use rules to limit the issues requiring
case-by-case consideration under a statutory scheme that, like section
9(b) of the NLRA, required individual determinations.151 Lastly, the notice echoed the earlier notices by expressing confidence in the value of the
product of the rulemaking. At the same time, the final notice recognized
that the undertaking did not resolve all uncertainty with respect to health
care unit determinations:
Finally, although we are highly satisfied with this rulemaking proceeding both because of the large amount of valuable information it
has given us and because, based on that information, we are confident
we have moved towards eliminating much of the unnecessary uncertainty existing in this area, we are under no illusions that the answers
we now provide will necessarily solve all health care unit problems, for
all time. This is our first venture in major, substantive rulemaking. At
information as "(name of organization)"; "(number)" of health care facilities owned by the

commenter; and "(number)" of employees; one submitted copy of the form letter did not
have the blanks filled in.

Id.
145. Id. For a description of the categories, see id. at 16,336-37.
146. See id. at 16,337.
147. See id.
148. See id at 16,337-39.
149. See id. at 16,338. The Board gave the following examples:
(1) [t]hat single facility units are presumptively appropriate; (2) that residual units are not
separately appropriate when sought by an incumbent; (3) that plant clericals and office
clericals do not constitute an appropriate unit absent agreement of the parties; (4) that the
appropriate unit in decertification elections is the certified or recognized unit.
Id. (citations omitted).
150. 461 U.S. 458 (1983).
151. See Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. at 16,338.
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some future date, after the rule has had a fair trial, it may be appropriate to reexamine the rule to determine how well it has worked, whether
new developments have changed our underlying assumptions and require different conclusions, and whether some other provisions might
improve those now promulgated.1 52
The final rule maintained the eight-unit structure proposed in NPR
11,153 but added definitions of key terms. 154 Most importantly, the rule
added a proviso that a "unit of five employees or fewer shall constitute an
'extraordinary circumstance' removing the case from strict application of
the rule, and the Board will consider by adjudication what the appropriate scope of the unit should be." 155
Member Johansen was the only member to dissent formally from
the product of the rulemaking, 5 6 consistent with his opposition to the
use of rulemaking in NPR 11.157 He adopted the position that the use of
rulemaking for determining health care units was both inappropriate and
undesirable. He first argued that the "in each case" language of section
9(b) foreclosed rulemaking for particular units.1 58 He further asserted
that even if the promulgation of such a rule were permissible, it would
not resolve the disagreement that existed in the Board and in the courts
over the meaning of the 1974 Health Care Amendments. This issue, according to Johansen, was a matter that should properly be resolved by a
definitive Supreme Court ruling.1 59 Finally, Johansen argued that the
health care industry could not tolerate the rigidity of the rule, nor could
the Board sustain the inflexibility of the rule in light of the evidence received and the changes made over the course of the rulemaking.1 60
IV.

LITIGATION CHALLENGING THE RULE

The final rule was published April 21, 1989, and was to become effective thirty days later. On the day the rule was published, however, the
AHA, a trade association representing over 5000 hospitals, filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois challenging the rule and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.1 6 1
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id at 16,339.
See id at 16,348.
See id
Id at 16,342.
See id. at 16,347.
See NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. at 33,934-35.
See Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. at 16,347.

159. See id
160. See id
161. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
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District Judge James Zagel issued a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the rule 62 on May 22, 1989, and, on July 25, 1989, declared the rule unlawful and granted a permanent injunction. 63 On
4
April 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,'6
but granted the AHA's motion to stay the order vacating the district
court order pending the disposition of an AHA petition for certiorari in
the Supreme Court.' 65 The Supreme Court granted the petition, 6 6 and,
1 67
on April 23, 1991, affirmed the Court of Appeals.
A.

DistrictCourt Proceeding

Upon issuing the preliminary injunction on May 22, 1989, the district court set an expedited briefing schedule for the hearing on the permanent injunction. The issuance of the preliminary injunction in effect
required the Board to establish a policy for processing petitions during
the pendency of the litigation challenging the rule. As previously explained, at the outset of the rulemaking the Board had decided to continue processing election petitions under the "disparity of interest"
standard developed through adjudication until a rule was issued. 68 Few
petitions, however, were filed during this period, presumably because the
standards of the proposed rule were more favorable for many key health
care unions than the existing standards and minimized the risk of litigation delays. This suggested that a number of health care unions had simply delayed petitions or further organizing efforts pending the completion
of the rulemaking. Thus, with a completed rulemaking but without an
enforceable rule, the Board faced a dilemma: Either it would have to
continue to process petitions under the pre-rule standards that were now
arguably inconsistent with the position it had taken in the rulemaking, or
it would have to suspend processing petitions while it sought to have the
injunction overturned. It chose essentially the latter course.
On May 30, 1989, eight days after the district court issued its preliminary injunction, the Board's Acting General Counsel Joseph Desio
issued a memorandum in which he advised regional offices to take the
following steps:
1. If the proposed health care unit does not involve an acutecare hospital, the Region should continue to process these cases. An
162. See id. at 705 n.1.
163. See id. at 716.
164. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1990). The opinion was authored
by Judge Richard Posner, and joined by Judges Kenneth Ripple and Michael Kanne.
165. See id. at 660.
166. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990).
167. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, III S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
168. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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acute-care hospital is defined [by] the Final Rule, and excludes facilities that are "primarily nursing homes, primarily psychiatric hospitals,
or primarily rehabilitation hospitals."
2. If the proposed unit involves an acute-care facility, and the
unit would be appropriate under St. Francis and St. Vincent the Region should continue to process these cases.
3. If the employer is an acute-care facility and the petition seeks
a separate unit for registered nurses, doctors, skilled maintenance employees or business office clericals, i.e., the case would be decided differently under the Final Rule than under St. Vincent, and the Region
cannot secure a stipulation as to the unit, please defer processing the
169
petition pending further notice.
Because almost all "delayed" petitions would have fallen into the
third category, the Desio memorandum, for all practical purposes,
stopped the processing of petitions in covered health care institutions.
Thus, the ironic effect of the issuance of the final rule coupled with the
issuance of the preliminary injunction and the Desio memorandum was
to bring to a halt formal organizing activities in acute care hospitals, the
most prominent part of the health care industry.
In the proceedings before the district court, the AHA made three
arguments: (1) the "in each case" language of section 9(b) of the Act
precluded the use of rulemaking to define units; (2) the rule contravened
the congressional admonition against "undue proliferation" in health
care units; and (3) the rule was arbitrary, capricious, and was not supported by substantial evidence. 170 The Board, apart from opposing the
three AHA arguments on the merits, also contended that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to review the regulation, either because it (like a
Board determination of an appropriate bargaining unit) was not a "final
order" within the NLRA scheme' 7 ' or because the case was not ripe. 172
On July 25, 1989, the district court issued the permanent injunction
against the rule. 73 After disposing of the Board's jurisdictional objection,' 74 the court rejected the AHA's argument that the "in each case"
language entirely foreclosed the Board from rulemaking with respect to
169. Memorandum of NLRB General Counsel No. 89-70 (May 30, 1989) (citations omitted),
reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 104, at A-2 (June 1, 1989).

170. See American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 718 F. Supp. 704, 705 (N.D. 111.1989).
171. See id at 705 n.2. In support of this position, the Board relied upon Boire v. Greyhound
Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964), Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), and American Fed'n of Labor v.
NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
172. See American Hospital, 718 F. Supp. at 705 n.2. In support of this position, the Board
relied upon Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), and its progeny.
173. American Hospital, 718 F. Supp. at 716.
174. See id. at 711. The Board abandoned these jurisdictional arguments on appeal.
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unit determinations. Instead, the court held that any rule that designated "an absolute number of appropriate units" for health care institutions was inconsistent with the congressional admonition against undue
proliferation. 175 Having concluded that the rule was unlawful on that
ground, the court found it unnecessary to consider the AHA argument
that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. 17 6
On July 31, the Board filed its notice of appeal of the district court
decision. The Board requested, but was denied, an expedited appeal.' 77
Although the Board's immediate objective was to overturn promptly the
district court decision, there was a further concern. Health care industry
representatives suggested that if the district court decision was overturned (or even if the district court had decided in favor of the Board)
further actions challenging the rule would be filed in other districts
throughout the country. 178 Because the NLRA does not specify the
method for judicial review of a Board rule, review could be had by way of
an action for declaratory and injunctive relief in virtually any U.S. dis-

trict court-traditional "non-statutory" review. 179 It was relatively
clear, however, that members of the AHA would be barred, under the

"association representation" branch of the preclusion doctrine, from
bringing any such subsequent action.' 80 Yet it was quite unclear whether

the numerous hospitals that were not members of the AHA would be
barred under the "virtual representation" branch of that doctrine from
asserting separate claims challenging the rule. 18 1 The uncertainty and
confusion that would have been created by successive actions challenging
the rule were resolved when the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and
175. See id. at 716.
176. See id. at 716 n.17.
177. The order denying the expedited appeal was entered on August 16, 1989.
178. For example, hospital attorney Roger King stated that "hospitals are entitled to challenge
the rules in 47 other states. 'Until the Supreme Court ultimately passes on the validity of the unit
determination rules... we will proceed in our clients' representation cases in precisely the same way
as we have done so in the past.'" David Burda, NLRB Preparesto Implement New HospitalBargaining Rules, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 23, 1990, at 3.
The AHA relied on this position in its petition for certiorari. See Petition for Certiorari at 2830, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991) (No. 90-97).
179. The presumption ofreviewability of final agency action, see APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 704
(1988); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967), coupled with the availability of broad
jurisdictional provisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (federal question); id. § 1337 (questions arising
under statutes regulating commerce), provide a basis for review of agency rulemaking even where
the statutory scheme granting rulemaking authority does not specifically provide for review of final
rules.
180. See Western Coal Traffic League v. ICC, 735 F.2d 1408, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 18
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAMCE AND PROCEDURE § 4456 (1981 & Supp. 1991).
181. See WRIGHT, supra note 180, § 4457.
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the elimination of that prospect was one of the factors that led the Board
18 2
not to oppose the AHA petition for certiorari.
B.

Court of Appeals Proceeding

The Court of Appeals decision on April 11, 1990 came nearly one
year after publication of the final rule. The decision reversed the district
court, vacated the injunction, and directed the district court to enter
judgment for the Board.18 3 Nevertheless, the court granted the motion
of the AHA to have its order stayed pending the filing and disposition of
4
the AHA's petition for certiorari.1 8
The opinion, written by Judge Posner, first rejected the argument
that the "in each case" language of 9(b) barred the rule, finding that the
terms of 9(b) taken as a whole suggested a less restrictive meaning and
that the "scant" legislative history of the provision was not inconsistent
with such an interpretation. 1 5 The opinion also rejected the argument
that the rule was inconsistent with the so-called "congressional admonition" against undue proliferation included in the House and Senate conmittee reports.18 6 Although the court treated the commentary as bona
fide legislative history,18 7 it concluded that interpreting the "admonitions" as equivalent to the failed unit determination provision would give
182. Brief on Petition for Certiorari for the National Labor Relations Board at 15-16, American
Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, lll S. Ct. 1539 (1991) (No. 90-97).
183. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 660 (7th Cir. 1990).
184. See Stay Order, May 3, 1990, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, Nos. 89-2604, 89-2605, and
89-2622 (7th Cir.); see also Seventh Circuit Grants Request to Stay NLRB Bargaining Unit Rule,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 88, at A-12 (May 7, 1990); Seventh Circuit Rejects NLRB Motion to
Reconsider Stay of Health Care Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 104, at A-10 (May 30, 1990).
185. See American Hospital, 899 F.2d at 656. The court recognized several possible
interpretations:
The reference in section 9(b) to employer, craft, and plant units suggests that the term
"in each case" was included to prevent the Board from bringing about a revolution in unit
determinations by prescribing employer units, or craft units, or plant units for all employers under the Board's jurisdiction.... But it is consistent with the background and semantics of the proviso that a "case" can be an industry or (as here) a subset or submarket of an
industry; it need not be a particular dispute between a particular employer and a particular
union at a particular plant or establishment.

Another possibility is that "in each case" simply expresses the truism that, whether or

not the Board proceeds by formal rulemaking, it still must determine the bargaining units
in each case in which there is a dispute over how to classify particular workers. In other

words, a rule, like a statute, is applied case-by-case. Still another possibility is that "case"

means "proceeding" in a sense broad enough to cover a rulemaking proceeding as well as

an adjudicative one.
Id. (citations omitted).
186. For a discussion of the judicial interpretation of this mandate, see supra text accompanying

notes 59-71.
187. The court reasoned:
Ordinarily a committee report that is not explaining new or altered statutory language
has little significance in the interpretation of a statute.... Congress legislates by passing
bills and sending them to the President for his signature. It does not legislate by issuing
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the industry "something it tried and failed to win from Congress." 188
Finally, the opinion rejected the AHA argument that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because it treated identically hospitals of different
89
sizes and missions in different locations.'
Thus, although the Board prevailed on all three issues before the
court of appeals, the court's subsequent stay order left the Board with a
rule that was still unenforceable. Under the terms of the order, vacation
of the injunction was stayed pending disposition of the case in the
Supreme Court.19 0
committee reports. Post-enactment legislative history... is sometimes a sneaky device for
trying to influence the interpretation of a statute, in derogation of the deal struck in the
statute itself among the various interests represented in the legislature....
The admonition in the 1974 committee reports is certainly not a statute, and courts
that have treated it as such have in our view erred.... The admonition lies between the
polar cases of a committee report that does not accompany legislative action and a committee report that explains a newly enacted or amended statute, but is we think closer to the
latter.... The admonition can therefore be regarded as a commentary on the meaning of
the 1974 amendments and hence as equivalent to pre-enactment legislative history, rather
than as a gratuitous comment unrelated to legislative action ....
American Hospital, 899 F.2d at 657-58.
188. The court explained:
[Tihe fact that the hospital industry would have dearly loved to amend the unit-determination provision yet failed to do so must give us pause in treating the "admonition" as if
it were a statute, which anyway it plainly is not. To treat it as one would give the hospital
industry something it tried and failed to win from Congress. Moreover the admonition
does not read like a statute. It is cautionary rather than directive.... [S]uch an expression
is entitled to our respectful consideration, not only for its intrinsic merits but also for what
light it sheds on Congress's intentions in the 1974 amendments. But it is not an amendment to section 9(b), decreeing that in the health-care industry no more than three separate
bargaining units shall be authorized.
Id. at 658 (citations omitted).
189. The court explained:
The lumping together of all acute-care hospitals into one category for purposes of
prescribing proper bargaining units does of course overlook a great deal of relevant diversity. What the hospital industry refuses to acknowledge is that this is the very nature of
rules. A rule makes one or a few of a mass of particulars legally decisive, ignoring the rest.
The result is a gain in certainty, predictability, celerity, and economy, and a loss in individualized justice. Often the tradeoffis worthwhile; at least the prevalence of rules in our legal
system so suggests. The hospital industry is acutely conscious of the costs of rules, but
disregards the benefits....
For its first forty-four years the Board tried to channel its discretion over unit determination in common law fashion, proposing and modifying standards case-by-case. That was
the approach it took when the nonprofit health care sector was brought under its aegis in
1974. The approach is widely regarded as a failure .... Against this dismal background it
was not unreasonable for the Board to experiment with substituting a tight rule for a loose
It gave plausible reasons for its choice.
standard ....
...It is not for us to fine-tune the regulatory process by telling the Labor Board'that
its rule should make slightly more distinctions than it does, or slightly fewer. The Board
did a responsible job of weighing the conflicting arguments, and we therefore uphold its
rule without pretending that we consider it Utopia.

Id. at 659-60.
190. See supra text accompanying note 165.
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Supreme Court Proceeding

The brief of the AHA in the Supreme Court 91 maintained all three
formal arguments that had been made in the courts below, but focused
on two themes that cut across the three arguments. First, the brief emphasized the "rigidity" of the rule in the face of "diversity" in the health
care industry and in light of the congressional non-proliferation admonition.192 Thus, rather than broadly attacking the legal authority of the
Board to use rulemaking, or even its authority to use rulemaking in some
fashion for unit issues, the brief argued that the outcome-determinative
character of this particular rule precluded the Board from considering
individual case differences as required by the "in each case" language.
Second, the brief urged that the use of rulemaking for health care unit
determinations, as well the rule itself, represented an abrupt and insufficiently explained departure from prior Board policy. 193 This theme drew
not only upon the Board's commitment to the adjudicative approach in
its prior health care unit decisions, but also upon its prior statements
concerning diversity in the health care industry as it affected unit determinations and prior Board decisions arguably inconsistent with the substance of the rule.
The broad theme of the Board's response to the AHA arguments
echoed Judge Posner's conclusion: The rule warranted judicial respect as
the careful and sensible product of a public process that would enable the
agency to function more fairly and efficiently by narrowing and defining
the scope of issues that must be adjudicated. 194 The Board's brief maintained that the "in each case" language simply ensured that individualized proceedings would be available for the application of any rules
(whether formulated in a rulemaking or an adjudication) that were relevant in a particular case. 195 The brief defended the health care unit rule,
and the proceeding underlying it, as fully reflecting a "due consideration" of the congressional admonition on the issue of bargaining unit
proliferation and as fully explaining any departure from prior policy. 196
In oral argument, the AHA exclusively concentrated on the import
of the "in each case" language. 197 It asserted that the rule left nothing
for the Board to determine "in each case," because even the exception for
191. Brief for the American Hospital Association, American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct.
1539 (1991) (No. 90-97).
192. See id.at 39.
193. See id at 40-41.
194. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 14-16, American Hospital (No. 90-97).
195. See id at 16-17.
196. See id. at 32-33.
197. See Hospital Industry Urges Court to Rule That NLRB Health Care Rule Violates Act,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at A-5 (Feb. 26, 1991).
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"extraordinary circumstances" was so narrowly drawn as to be "illusory." 198 Questioning from the Court required counsel for the AHA to
distinguish between this use of rulemaking and other widely accepted
uses of rulemaking that limit hearing rights, including "rules" formulated by the Board in adjudications. 199 Although AHA counsel sought
to differentiate the health care unit rule by arguing that other rules left
more room for case-by-case determination, 2°° at bottom the AHA position was that the "in each case" language of the Act uniquely limited the
power of the Board to make outcome-determinative rules on unit
questions.
In response, the Board argued not only that the critical statutory
language was not a substantive limit on its rulemaking authority, but also
that even in processing petitions under the health care rule it would be
necessary to make individualized determinations, most obviously that the
petitioned-against party was in fact an "acute care hospital. ' 20 1 Counsel
for the Board did not, however, attempt to argue that the rule satisfied
the "in each case" language merely because it provided an exception for
"unusual circumstances." Instead, counsel essentially conceded the narrowness of the exception, and, in response to a question from the Court,
20 2
asserted that the rule would be valid even without the exception.
Board counsel also addressed the "congressional admonition" and "arbithe AHA had raised in its brief but
trary and capricious" arguments that
20 3
had not pursued in oral argument.
On April 23, 1991, less than two months after oral argument, a
unanimous Court, speaking through Justice Stevens, affirmed the Seventh Circuit.2 °4 In upholding the validity of the rule, the Court reasoned
that the Board's general rulemaking authority "was unquestionably sufficient to authorize the rule.., unless limited by some other provision in
the Act."' 20 5 Turning to the "in each case" language, the Court rejected
the AHA reading of the provision as such a limit:
Although the contours of the restriction that petitioner ascribes to the
phrase are murky, petitioner's reading of the language would prevent
the Board from imposing any industry-wide rule delineating the appropriate bargaining units....
198. Id. at A-6.
199. See id
200. See id
201. See id at A5-A7.

202. See id at A6.
203. See id
204. American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 111 S. Ct. 1539 (1991).
205. Id. at 1542.
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The more natural reading of these three words is simply to indicate that whenever there is a disagreement about the appropriateness
of a unit, the Board shall resolve the dispute. Under this reading, the
words "in each case" are synonymous with "whenever necessary" or
"inany case in which there is a dispute."...
In resolving such a dispute, the Board's decision is presumably to
be guided not simply by the basic policy of the Act but also by the
rules that the Board develops to circumscribe and to guide its discretion either in the process of case-by-case adjudication or by the exer20 6
cise of its rulemaking authority.

The Court further found that the "structure and policy" of the Act,
as well as the legislative history of the unit determination provision, "reinforced" this view of the statutory language. 20 7 Had the term "in each
case" been intended to limit the broad section 6 rulemaking authority of
the Board, the Court reasoned, Congress would have been "expected to
do so in language expressly describing an exception from that section or
at least referring specifically to the section." 20 8 Likewise, if the provision
"had been intended to place an important limitation on the scope of the
Board's rulemaking powers," the legislative history would have been expected to contain "some expression of that intent. '20 9 Citing Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResourcesDefense Council,Inc.,210 the Court concluded by observing: "Even if we could find any ambiguity in § 9(b) after
206. Id at 1542-43. As had the Board, the Court quoted Professor Davis's conclusion that the
statutory language "does not prevent the Board from supplanting the original discretionary chaos
with some degree of order." See supra note 96 and accompanying text. The Court continued:
This reading of the "in each ease" requirement comports with our past interpretations of
similar provisions in other regulatory statutes. These decisions confirm that, even if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker has the authority
to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress
clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority.
Even petitioner acknowledges that "the Board could adopt rules establishing general
principles to guide the required case-by-case bargaining unit determinations." Petitioner
further acknowledges that the Board has created many such rules in the half-century during which it has adjudicated bargaining unit disputes. Petitioner contends, however, that a
rule delineating the appropriate bargaining unit for an entire industry is qualitatively different from these prior rules, which at most established rebuttable presumptions that certain
units would be considered appropriate in certain circumstances.
We simply cannot find in the three words "in each case" any basis for the fine distinction that petitioner would have us draw. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the Board's
rule is not an irrebuttable presumption; instead, it contains an exception for "extraordinary
circumstances." Even if the rule did establish an irrebuttable presumption, it would not
differ significantly from the prior rules adopted by the Board. As with its prior rules, the
Board must still apply the rule "in each case." For example, the Board must decide in
each case, among a host of other issues, whether a given facility is properly classified as an
acute care hospital and whether particular employees are properly placed in particular
units.
American Hospital, 111 S.Ct. at 1543 (citations omitted).
207. See American Hospital, 111 S. Ct. at 1543.
208. Id
209. Id. at 1544.
210. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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employing the traditional tools of statutory construction, we would still
2 11
defer to the Board's reasonable interpretation of the statutory text."1
The Court also rejected the various forms of the AHA argument
that the congressional admonition created a judicially enforceable standard for Board health care units determinations. It read the admonition
as:
a form of notice to the Board that if it did not give appropriate consideration to the problem of proliferation in this industry, Congress might
respond with a legislative remedy.... If Congress believes that the

Board has not given "due consideration"
to the issue, Congress may
2 12
fashion an appropriate response.
Finally, the court rejected the AHA argument that the rule was arbitrary and capricious because it ignored "critical differences among the
21 3
more than 4,000 acute-care hospitals in the United States":
Given the extensive notice and comment rulemaking conducted by the
Board, its careful analysis of the comments that it received, and its
well-reasoned justification for the new rule, we would not be troubled
even if there were inconsistencies between the current rule and prior
NLRB pronouncements. The [statute] ...contemplates the possibility

that the Board will reshape its policies on the basis of more information and experience in the administration of the Act. The question
whether the Board has changed its view about certain issues or certain
industries does not undermine the validity of a rule that is based
on
214
substantial evidence and supported by a "reasoned analysis."1

The Court further held that "[the fact that petitioner can point to a
hypothetical case in which the rule might lead to an arbitrary result does
not render the rule 'arbitrary or capricious.' ",215 The Court reasoned
that it was "likely" that if the Board was presented with a case to which
its application of the rule would be arbitrary, "the Board would conclude
21 6
that 'extraordinary circumstances' justified a departure from the rule.

211. American Hospital, 111 S. Ct. at 1544.
212. Id. at 1545-46 (citation omitted).

213. Id. at 1546.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1547.
216. Id. (citation omitted). The Court noted, however, that even if "the Board might decline to
do so, we cannot conclude the entire rule is invalid on its face." Id.
Addressing the Board's attention in the rulemaking to the issue of diversity in the health care
industry, the Court observed:
The Board's conclusion that, absent extraordinary circumstances, "acute care hospitals do not differ in substantial, significant ways relating to the appropriateness of units,"
was based on a "reasoned analysis" of an extensive record. The Board explained that
diversity among hospitals had not previously affected the results of bargaining unit determinations and that diversification did not make rulemaking inappropriate. The Board justified its selection of the individual bargaining units by detailing the factors that supported
generalizations as to the appropriateness of those units.
Id. at 1546-47 (citations omitted).
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By rejecting all three arguments of the AHA, the Court not only put
to rest the question of the validity of the health care unit rule, but also
authoritatively resolved the significance of the congressional admonition
with respect to proliferation of health care units and the power of the
Board to use rulemaking generally and for unit issues particularly.
V.

EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Any evaluation of these events must begin with the observation that
the first major substantive use of rulemaking by the Board is, without
more, a matter of some significance for both administrative practice generally, and national labor policy particularly. Symbolically, a barrier has
fallen. An agency that for more than fifty years abjured a policymaking
technique that is one of the hallmarks of American administrative practice has shed its curmudgeonly procedural image. Labor policy, if only
in a single instance, has been influenced by the form and character of
public participation that notice and comment rulemaking provides. Yet
does this historic event mark a turning point in Board policy and practice? This question is divided into several sub-questions below. Some
tentative (and admittedly omewhat speculative) answers are offered.
A.

Why Now?

First, to what extent was the Board's willingness to pursue a new
policymaking technique influenced by the particularly difficult policy dilemma it faced after a thirteen-year struggle with the Health Care
Amendments and the decision of the D.C. Circuit in St. Francis II?
Clearly, this was an important factor. Any prospect for a fresh approach
would have seemed attractive. Although seeking Supreme Court review
in an adjudication was certainly a possibility, that approach would have
bound the Board to defending a policy about which some members may
have had lingering doubts and would, given the mixed results in the circuits and subtle distinctions in a number of Board decisions, have risked
surrendering to the Supreme Court some relatively important policy
choices. Nevertheless, this was not the only difficult policy issue facing
the Board in mid-1987 and, given the controversy it had generated, the
issue of health care unit determinations was an especially complex and
risky problem on which to experiment with an untried policymaking
device.
What else, then, may have influenced the Board to proceed by
rulemaking? Beginning in the early 1980s, labor leaders became increasingly vocal and direct in their criticism of evolving Board policy that
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they perceived to be hostile to unions. 2 17 By the time the health care
rulemaking was begun, labor had demonstrated its displeasure with
Board policy under some circumstances by avoiding use of its
processes. 218 Board caseload, as well as Board credibility with an important part of its regulated constituency, was thus affected. Although
rulemaking posed the risk for unions of locking in unfavorable policy, it
also offered the prospect of reducing delays in accomplishing representation by limiting the opportunities for litigation. It is thus possible that
the Board decision to undertake rulemaking was intended, in part, by
some members as an invitation to an estranged constituency to return to
2 19
the regulatory process.
Most likely both the pressing need for a clean solution to the health
care unit issue and a desire to improve relations with labor influenced the
Board. But the factor that may ultimately have tipped the balance in
favor of a decision to proceed with rulemaking was staff initiative. In
1981, the Director of the Office of Representation Appeals, Berton Subrin, had written an article suggesting the desirability of using rulemaking
to resolve unit issues. 220 At the point the Board was forced to confront
St. FrancisII on remand, Subrin was presumably still persuaded of the
utility of rulemaking and was in the position to convey his views to the
22 1
Board.
If the coincidence of these three factors led to the initiation of the
rulemaking, will further Board rulemaking require a similarly compelling
set of circumstances? Perhaps, but the fact that the process has now been
used eliminates a significant aspect of the inertia that serves to inhibit
agency experimentation of this sort. A far more important factor bearing
on the likelihood of further Board rulemaking will be the implicit costbenefit analysis that both members and staff will undertake as the rule is
put into effect.

217. For example, in 1984, AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland asserted that, given the way the
NLRA was being enforced, organized labor would be better off if the Act were repealed. See Cathy
Trost & Leonard M. Apear, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a 'DeadLetter', WALL ST. J., Aug.
16, 1984, at 8.
218. For example, William Wynn, President of the United Food and Commercial Workers of
America, indicated in 1984 that his union would boycott the Board. See Has Labor Law Failed?:
Joint OversightHearingsBefore the Subcomm. on LaborManagementRelationsof the Senate Comm.
on Education and Labor and Manpower and the Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-60 (1984).
219. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
220. See Subrin, supra note 3.
221. In fact, Subrin participated in the two open meetings of the Board held prior to the issuance
of the notice of proposed rulemaking. See Transcript of Meetings of May 15, 1987 and June 9, 1987.
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Did It Work?

Undoubtedly, an important element in this cost-benefit analysis is
the positive reaction of the Supreme Court to the Board's initiative. Both
symbolically and practically, an adverse Supreme Court decision would

have been devastating for the forces within the Board that might stimulate further use of rulemaking. The breadth and clarity of the Supreme
Court's approval of the rule suggests a strong, if inexplicit, endorsement
of rulemaking as a useful polieymaking vehicle. 222
An equally important element is also a particularly speculative one:
Will the rule in fact reduce litigation and delay in representation proceedings? Until the rule is allowed to operate for a period, this question
cannot be answered reliably. Nevertheless, the prognosis for the rule
seems good. The terms of the rule are clear and straightforward. The
rule establishes appropriate units; it does not merely set standards for
units or presume certain units to be appropriate. Although the rule has
an "extraordinary circumstances" exception, the Board has made clear
that it intends to construe this provision narrowly, and that the process

for testing out the applicability of the exception to particular cases will
not in itself be delay-inducing. 223 The most likely problem would be a
222. Although the opinion contains no explicit praise for the Board's turn to rulemaking for
policy formulation nor encouragement to continue in that direction, the Court's unequivocal validation of the rule, despite industry arguments of critical economic implications, conveys respect for the
effort to resolve a difficult policy issue through a previously avoided policymaking device. The closing paragraph of the opinion, while separating the Court from the substance of the policy, recognizes
the authority of the Board to make such policy choices through rulemaking:
In this opinion, we have deliberately avoided any extended comment on the wisdoin of
the rule, the propriety of the specific unit determinations, or the importance of avoiding
work stoppages in acute care hospitals. We have pretermitted such discussion not because
these matters are unimportant but because they primarily concern the Board's exercise of
its authority rather than the limited scope of our review of the legal arguments presented
by petitioner. Because we find no merit in any of these legal arguments, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
American Hospital, 111 S. Ct. at 1547.
223. In NPR II, the Board explained:
To satisfy the requirement of "extraordinary circumstances," a party would have to
bear the "heavy burden" to demonstrate that "its arguments are substantially different
from those which have been carefully considered at the rulemaking proceeding," as, for
instance, by showing the existence of such unusual and unforeseen deviations from the
range of circumstances revealed at the hearings and known to the Board from more than
13 years of adjudicating cases in this field, that it would be unjust or an abuse of discretion
for the Board to apply the rules to the facility involved.
The Board, contrary to some industry representatives .... anticipates that litigation
under the "extraordinary circumstances" exception will be rare; the AHA, representing the
largest group of health care employers in this proceeding, has indicated it understands that
the Board intends to limit exceptions to "truly extraordinary situations," and neither the
AHA nor any other employer (or union) representative has raised objections to the Board's
stated intent.
In most instances, should a facility claim it comes within the "extraordinary circumstances" exception, it should present an offer of proof to the Hearing Officer, who will then
either permit the requested evidence to be adduced, or, we anticipate far more commonly,
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shift in the focus of management litigation from questions of the appropriateness of particular units to questions of "placement" of employees in
concededly appropriate units, i.e., in which units do employees performing a particular set of duties belong? At least with respect to acute care
hospitals, the Board apparently believes these are manageable issues and
seems prepared to respond to attempts to upset the rule's implementation
224
with such tactics.
Assuming the rule can be efficiently implemented, the challenge
then becomes determining the costs to the Board in promulgating the
rule. Almost two years elapsed between the time when the Board decided to engage in rulemaking and when it issued the final rule. During
this period, substantial staff time, including a significant amount of highlevel staff time, was used to manage the rulemaking and to assist in the
analysis of the product of the hearings and comment periods. The novelty of the proceeding for the Board meant that some of this time was
spent developing new procedural expertise, but a large part of the time
was devoted to dealing with the hearing and comment process, with a
large rulemaking record, and with relatively complex substantive issues.
Not only was the time commitment significant as an absolute matter, but
also because regular staff rather than special rulemaking staff was used,
this staff time was thus invested at a cost to other matters. Nevertheless,
efficient implementation of the rule should lead to offsetting staff time
savings through straightforward application of the rule for unit determinations rather than staff involvement in the previously required
litigation.
Moreover, a portion of the two years was consumed with a procedure not required for notice and comment rulemaking-multi-location
hearings with an opportunity for a form of cross-examination. The possible Board rationales for using such hearings and the burdens and benefits
of the hearings have been previously noted.2 25 Under the circumstances
of this rulemaking, particularly its novelty for the Board, the hearings
were probably a desirable choice. Certainly as a legal matter, however,
and perhaps as a practical matter, the hearings were procedural overkill
and the burdens created by the number and structure of the hearings

refer the offer to the Regional Director, and, if requested, ultimately to the Board, for
ruling.
NPR II, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900, 33,932-33 (1988) (citations omitted).
224. See id. at 33,932 ("[O]ur intent is to construe the extraordinary circumstances exception
narrowly, so it does not provide an excuse, opportunity, or 'loophole' for redundant or unnecessary
litigation and the concomitant delay that would ensue.").
225. See supra text accompanying notes 104-25.
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would have to be considered as part of the overall cost-benefit evaluation
of the rulemaking.
Finally, the post-issuance litigation challenging the rule and the effect of that litigation on implementation of the rule is a necessary part of
the evaluation. As noted earlier, in St. Vincent the Board decided that
during the pendency of the rulemaking, the prior standards for unit determinations would apply so that petitions could continue to be
processed. Apart from the strategic withholding of petitions by unions
that anticipated more favorable opportunities after the issuance of a rule,
the business-as-usual approach was reasonable and had no further cost.
But clearly the Board anticipated that as soon as the rule became effective, it would be implemented. When the district court enjoined enforcement of the rule, the Board faced a new cost. It effectively chose to
suspend processing health care petitions rather than to attempt to defend
possibly inconsistent positions: the old versus the new standards. The
consequence was that for a period of almost two years few acute care
hospital petitions were processed. It must be recognized, however, that
Supreme Court review was responsible for a substantial portion of the
delay and would not likely be a part of future rulemakings. Nevertheless,
in this case, the rulemaking and judicial review consumed over three and
one half years and have had an effect on the normal representation process at the Board. Furthermore, the prospect of successive challenges to
the rule throughout the country loomed as an additional barrier to implementation of the rule and was put to rest only after the Supreme Court
226
granted the petition for certiorari.
C.

What Was Learned?

Putting aside the yet unknowable effects that the rule will have as it
is implemented, it seems clear the proceeding accomplished the major
putative purposes of rulemaking. First, the Board accumulated an enormous volume of empirical data that simply had not been available to it in
adjudications; it thoroughly digested that information and used it effectively in formulating the final rule. Second, the process provided a degree of openness and broad-scale participation simply unmatched by
even the most open traditional Board proceedings-oral arguments with
representative amici. Third, the product of the rulemaking is a model of
clarity as expression of policy in an area that had historically been consumed by excessive subtlety and complexity. Finally, the rule promises a
226. The Supreme Court decision in this case, of course, only resolves the validity of this particu.
lar rule; any further rulemaking would remain subject to the same prospect for delay.
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degree of stability for a policy area that had been overwhelmed by
change. In short, the case can be made, paraphrasing the words of Pro227
fessor Morris, that the "old Board has learned a new trick."
D. Recommendations
Faced with a difficult and lingering policy question, the Board
boldly chose to experiment with a policymaking device previously untried in the agency. It cannot be said, however, that the choice represented a broad new commitment to formulating national labor policy
through rulemaking. This rulemaking was an exercise in pragmatism-a
thorough, careful, and productive administrative response to a particular
set of circumstances. Nevertheless, the rulemaking gives the Board experience upon which it can build. Much depends upon the success of the
rule in accomplishing in representation proceedings the objectives the
Board sought through rulemaking. Yet even as the record develops on
the implementation of the rule, there are steps that could be taken that
228
may enhance the prospects for further rulemaking.
The most formal of these steps would be to amend the NLRA to
provide specifically for preenforcement judicial review of a final Board
rule. This would confine review to a single proceeding, thus avoiding the
confusion and inefficiency of serial challenges to a rule. The simplest and
most traditional provision along this line would authorize an exclusive
proceeding in any one of the courts of appeals.22 9 Consistent with wellrecognized needs for prompt and comprehensive review when rules having broad national impact are challenged, the provision should also impose a time limit on seeking preenforcement review, and should preclude
review in enforcement proceedings of questions of (1) whether the rule
was within the authority of the Board, (2) whether procedural requirements for the rulemaking were satisfied, and (3) whether there was ade230
quate support for the rule in the rulemaking record.
227. See Morris, supra note 3, at 9.
228. These measures must be coupled with a willingness on the part of at least a majority of the
Board to use rulemaking. Three members of the current Board (Chairman Stephens and Members
Cracraft and Devaney) supported the health care unit rulemaking. The position of the other two
current members (Oviatt and Raudabaugh) on the use of rulemaking is not a matter of record.
229. See The Choice of Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Recommendation
No. 75-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.75-3 (1991).
230. See Judicial Review in Enforcement Proceedings (Recommendation No. 82-7), 1 C.F.R.
§ 305.82-7 (1991); see also Paul R. Verkuil, CongressionalLimitations on Judicial Review of Rules,
57 TUL. L. RE. 733 (1983) (discussing the extent to which Congress should limit judicial review of
agency rules).
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Although there is no apparent need to amend the NLRA to provide
a more detailed procedure for rulemaking than is provided by section 553
of the APA, 23 1 it would be desirable for the Board to develop a standard
set of rulemaking procedures that would be in place and understood
should another proceeding be undertaken. In formulating such procedures, the Board should consider whether the hearing component of the
health-care unit rulemaking yielded a form of participation and data that
should be carried forward into future rulemakings or whether written
comments and data would suffice. 232 Given the burdens the hearings imposed, and recognizing the procedural variations available even in a written comment process, there appears to be little reason for the Board to
hold such hearings as a matter of course.
Similarly, it is possible that further use of rulemaking would be a
more realistic prospect for the Board, as an institutional matter, if there
were a staff that could be called upon to provide support regardless of the
particular subject of the rulemaking. Such a staff not only might provide
support in ongoing proceedings, but also might be a source of substantive
and procedural expertise in considering future rulemakings.
A regularized method for identifying manageable and timely subjects for possible rulemaking could also facilitate this form of policymaking. The body of law represented by the cases adjudicated over the fiftyfive year history of the Board is enormous and complex. Any notion that
this entire body of law, or even any substantial part of it, can be reduced
to useful rules through the rulemaking process is simply unrealistic. Yet
by combining a rulemaking staff with an internal process for identifying
and evaluating potential subjects for rulemaking, the Board could inform
itself more fully of the consequences of the procedural choices it inevitably makes when it consciously engages in policymaking.
Factors that should influence the selection of further subjects for
rulemaking include not only the considerations traditionally posited in
connection with agency choice between rulemaking and adjudication, 233
but also considerations unique to the Board's institutional structure and
enforcement responsibilities. 234 Even where the choices for rulemaking
seem obvious, as in the case of health care units, or perhaps in a new area
of Board law, such as regulating the range of activities for which a union
231. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988) (requiring the agency to provide notice of the rulemaking proceedings, an opportunity for meaningful participation by interested persons, and publication of a
substantive rule within 30 days).
232. See Procedures in Addition to Notice and the Opportunity for Comment in Informal

Rulemaking (Recommendation No. 76-3), 1 C.F.R. § 305.76-3 (1990).
233. See, eg., Berg, supra note 10; Shapiro, supra note 3.
234. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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may expend dues and fees collected pursuant to union security provisions, 235 something might be gained by preliminary staff investigation
and analysis. This function could perhaps be performed adequately
within existing staffs, but for purposes of obtaining a meaningful overview of rulemaking prospects, a staff with no fixed substantive domain
may offer an advantage.
Finally, in any instance in which the possible subject for rulemaking
is one treated by existing Board law (as opposed to an entirely new subject), the Board faces a difficult choice if enforcement of the rule is enjoined during the review process. The Board will have committed itself
to a position that may be inconsistent with its prior position, but one
which it is then barred from implementing. Using the prior position and
defending its use is difficult, but suspending action in an area pending
final determination on a newly promulgated rule has its costs as well.
Although the effect of this scenario could vary depending on the particular rule at issue, and might also be offset by a single statutorily prescribed
review proceeding as suggested above, 236 it is a matter about which the
Board should formulate a general policy. Given its broad enforcement
responsibilities, the Board should ordinarily continue to apply existing
law during the pendency of a rulemaking as it did with health care unit
determinations. Yet once a rule is promulgated, even though it may become the subject of judicial review, the Board should ordinarily apply the
law expressed in the rule as promulgated-unless a court order issued in
the course of the review proceeding would preclude that action.
Although unusual circumstances may require departure from this approach, adherence to existing law during rulemaking followed by prompt
implementation of any newly adopted rules is consistent both with the
concept of prospective policymaking through the consideration and promulgation of rules and with the responsibility of the Board to provide
ongoing enforcement of the NLRA.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Adoption of the measures recommended here will only facilitate the
use of rulemaking by the Board, not ensure greater use. Short of legislatively mandated rulemaking, the likelihood of further Board rulemakings
ultimately depends upon a judgment that this policymaking device meaningfully contributes to the effectuation of the purposes of the NLRA, as
235. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
236. See supra text accompanying notes 231-32.

324

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:274

those purposes are understood by individual Board members. The health
care unit rulemaking and its aftermath will provide critical data as that
issue is considered. Perhaps most importantly, it will serve to move discussion from the abstract to the concrete.

